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
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
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
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



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By the Same Author

The Great Illusion
Arms and Industry
America and the World State
The World's Highway
The Dangers of Half-Preparedness

The Dangers of Half-Preparedness

A Plea for a Declaration of American Policy

An Address by

Norman Angell

Author of

"The Great Illusion," "Arms and Industries"



**G. P. Putnam's Sons
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
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NORMAN ANGELL

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To the shorthand report of an address delivered at Poli's Theatre, Washington, February 28th, 1916, I have added some footnotes and one or two passages from other addresses that help to give precision to the meaning.



The Dangers of Half-Preparedness

Ladies and Gentlemen : I am going to pay you—this audience—a very great compliment. I am going to assume that you really do desire to understand the very difficult and serious problems which confront you to-day. I am not going to try and stir your emotions by glowing periods, or anything of that sort; I am simply going to try and make a contribution towards the understanding of a difficulty, to suggest a line of thought which you may be able to develop, and which may help you perhaps in your attempt to answer questions you must answer, from which you cannot run away.

And since to talk to a definite proposition helps to keep things clear, I am going to nail

my thesis to the church door as it were, by reading it to you and using it as a text. It is the only thing which I shall read to you this afternoon, because reading is a dull business at a meeting like this. But it will enable me right at the start to be very precise as to what it is that I am driving at.

The title of my address is "The Dangers of Half-Preparedness," and the proposition implied in that title is:

(1) That preparedness is dangerously incomplete when it does not include a clear formulation of foreign policy—what we intend to exact from or defend against foreign nations by our military power; the rights of trade, immigration, residence, which we are prepared to grant to foreigners, European and Asiatic, in our own territory and in that which we now, or may later by our increasing power, control; the rights which we demand for our citizens on land, as in Mexico, and on sea, as in the conflict with Germany and England; just how far we will use our military and naval force to coöperate with other nations in upholding what we may decide to be common rights on land or sea; at what point we shall decline to allow such common action to lead us into entangling alliances; the conditions upon which we are prepared to live together with other nations in this world of ours, and to share it with them.

(2) That so long as it is unknown for what purpose,

on behalf of what policy and general principles our military power will be used; so long as its general purpose is not manifest, to ourselves, the world at large, and our prospective enemy, it will, however great, fail to protect our nation and our interest, to ensure peace or to secure our rights; and if we get the armament first and leave the policy to be announced later, the increased armament may prove not merely ineffective in the attainment of such ends, but may be instrumental in defeating them, since sooner or later, increased armament of unknown purpose would, either by increase of power on the part of other nations or by hostile alliances, be neutralized, canceled.

(3) That it is not sufficient that the intention behind a nation's power should be inoffensive and in no way threaten others; the specific object of the power, the foreign policy it supports, must be made clear to others in the way that members of an alliance like that between Russia, England, and France make their respective objects clear to one another. In the absence of that definite understanding power must be mutually threatening (as illustrated in the past military rivalry of the three nations just mentioned), since the basic principle of national defense in the modern world is that superior alien force the object of which is not manifest must be met by equivalent or greater force; which makes security depend upon the attainment of a condition in which each shall be stronger than the other; that is, upon a physical impossibility.

In addition to the maintenance of this proposition that an essential part of preparedness

is a formulation of policy toward other nations, I want to urge that:

(a) A successful American international policy must be the outcome of widely expressed public opinion: it cannot be presented ready-made to the country by a President or an Administration, because it involves, in the radically changing conditions of the world, revolutionary departure from precedent, grave questions of principle which the public alone can decide. Nor can decision be left to a time of crisis. Human nature being combative, coercive, guided largely by impulse and passion and very little by reason and reflection, to expect wisdom at such a time is to ask intellectual and moral miracles of men.

(b) Nothing in the foregoing implies a disparagement of armament; it is an argument, not that the advocate of preparedness is asking too much, but that he is asking too little; not that we do not need armament, but that we need something else as well; it is an argument not against preparedness, but against preparedness by dangerous half measures.

That is a pretty ponderous text, I admit. I promise not to inflict anything more quite like it upon you.

Now I want you particularly to note its concluding clause. This proposition of mine—the proposition that unless you make it clear for what purpose your power is going to

be used you are only half prepared—is no disparagement of arms. I want to emphasize that. Personally I am not a non-resister. I believe in defense. My point is that your defense, your security, is not reliable and cannot be reliable however efficient your arms, so long as you neglect this other side of preparedness. I cannot too often repeat that my complaint against the “preparedness” man is not that he is asking too much but that he is asking too little. Indeed you cannot possibly tell whether an instrument is adequate until you know for what purpose it is going to be used. It is quite obvious that you cannot possibly tell what is adequate preparation until you know at least approximately what it is preparation for; whether you are likely to face one nation or a combination, to face it, or them, alone, or in conjunction with allies. Obviously, when your preparedness man shouts for adequate preparation without even having an opinion on these things—and for the most part he has not the vaguest—his opinion as to what is adequate defense is worth just nothing; and what we need in the way of army and navy and the rest of it must be the crudest kind of guesswork.

Now you know perfectly well that in all this talk of preparedness which we are now hearing, there is a neglect, an almost complete neglect, of this side of the problem. We are securing the instrument of military power without knowing what we are going to do with it. And unless you do know, and the world at large knows, and particularly your prospective enemy—it will be ineffective when you do come to use it.

And my proposition of course goes farther.

As long as the other fellow does not know what your power is for, the more that you pile it up, the more dangerous is your situation likely to become.

This war in Europe has arisen and the nations have become so dangerously insecure, mainly because of the fact that each did not know how the other might use his growing power. And what each side is now fighting for mainly—indeed it is the only clear purpose for which they are fighting—is security from the abuse of the other man's power. It is possible that the various territorial adjustments could be made—at least in the West—but if you question an informed Englishman or Frenchman he will tell you that the war

goes on mainly in order that the Allies may destroy once for all the menace of German militarism, and finally get a secure peace. And when the German is told that his enemies are fighting to destroy his military power he points out that that means that they are fighting to deprive him of any means of defense, and to place him within the power of nations like Russia. And he adds of course that no man who believes in self-defense will thus place himself within the power of his enemy, within the power of any force the objects behind which are so uncertain that it may threaten his national security. I shall have more to say about that in a moment. I will now just say this: I think that later, when one day we come in cold blood to examine the major motives and impulses behind this war, we shall find that there wasn't any real conflict of interest at all between, for instance, the British and German peoples, that the specific causes of dispute between the two governments in the years which preceded the war were relatively trivial, and that what really caused the collision was simply that each did not know what the other would do with his power when it grew to larger

dimensions, so each felt it had to challenge it, control it.

If we look back in history, we find plenty of arms and fighting; men never seem to have shown much unreadiness for that; but we find little patience to understand each other's purposes, little tendency to make those adjustments by which, alone, men can live together.

I put it to you that you are neglecting this outstanding lesson: that so far there is every indication that your own preparedness is by the dangerous half-measures I have indicated; that you are neglecting to formulate in your own public opinion, and to make clear to the world, how your power is going to be used.

Now, you may say the other fellow knows perfectly well how your power is going to be used. It is a notification to him to keep out; that you do not need to define its object more than that. The average advocate of preparedness takes it for granted that armies are for the purpose simply of defense, of repelling the invader. He would have you believe that wars arise from nations suddenly turning

themselves into pirates and starting out to loot their neighbour's property.

Again, I suggest to you that that overlooks very nearly all the facts; that in the multitude of causes which underlie international conflict, very few are bound up with the desire of one developed nation to seize the territory of another irrespective of other causes of conflict. The truth is that every great nation, in multiple contact with the world, as yours is, is obliged to use its power for many things other than the sheer defense of its soil; every great nation is, in fact, obliged to defend a policy rather than a territory, and however unaggressive, to resent, it may be, the policy, or what it believes to be the policy, of some other nation, even when that falls a long way short of sheer invasion.

I will try and explain what I mean by that. It is an important distinction.

Take an extreme imaginary case purely by way of illustration.

Suppose it were your national policy to say to the rest of the world: "We really do not care who runs our government. If the German, for instance, thinks that he could come here and govern this country better than the Irish

have done so far—well, let him try.” Such policy would not expose you to military invasion, because Germany, of course, would not *need* to land a soldier, and you would still of course remain in possession of your property, your soil. Germany did not take the property of the Alsatians in 1872. She only changed their government. And I am assuming that the Germans, running your government, would not rob you much more than Tammany. Really they probably wouldn’t. Suppose that were your policy, which very properly it is not—obviously you would not want an army or a navy at all. If, on the other hand, you were to say that you would never allow another human being to set foot on this hemisphere, north or south—why that would probably require a large army to enforce. The difference between what would require no army and what would need a large one would be a difference, an extreme difference, of policy.

Now the fact that wars arise out of a conflict of “policy” instead of being merely to repel invasion, could be shown particularly, of course, by this present war in Europe. But it is shown just as much by your own history.

Since you became an independent state

you have had several wars, and you have been near to several more wars. Not one of those wars, or near wars, has been for the purpose of repelling an invader; not one.¹

Take the first war which you fought as an independent state, that against the Barbary pirates. The pirates were not invading your soil. You resented a certain policy which the other Powers of Christendom were quite prepared to accept, the payment of tribute. You, very properly, resented it, and fought a war in northern Africa. But there was no invasion of your territory involved.

Take the next war, the War of 1812. That was not a war against an invading nation, but to resent a certain highhandedness on the

¹ This address was delivered before the expedition into Mexico for the capture of Villa. Villa's raid is the nearest approach to an invasion as the precipitating cause of a war, which the United States has known. But the "shooting up" of a western town by an outlaw cannot properly be called an invasion by a hostile nation, and the expedition is not, as a matter of fact, fighting a foreign government; that government on the contrary is coöperating with it. The soundness of the point here made is in no wise affected by the hunting down of Villa or fellow-bandits by Mexican and American troops.

high seas, which you are still busily—and unsuccessfully—resenting!

The war with Mexico, if it was about territory at all, was, I am afraid, rather for the purpose of taking territory rather than defending it. Anyhow, if that was not the object of the war it was the result.

Take the foreign war which followed, the war with Spain. No American pretends that this country was in very great danger from the troops of the little boy King Alphonso. Spain was not attempting to invade your country. That war was fought in prosecution of a certain national policy; a perfectly good policy it may be.

Take the war which followed—a war we are apt to forget about—that in the Philippines. I do not suppose any Americans thought this country was in very great danger from the troops of Aguinaldo, yet you fought a war, a very troublesome one, three thousand miles from your shores.

And if you had gone to war after the bombardment of Vera Cruz—or shall we say if the war there begun had continued—it would not have been because this country was in danger from the troops of Huerta, or Zapata,

or Villa, or Carranza, or any other of the interesting presidents whose names I happen to have forgotten. You would have gone to war, as you always have, on behalf of a certain national policy.

Now, please do not misunderstand me. I am not even hinting that the policy is necessarily aggressive, or provocative. It may be a perfectly good policy, but all those conflicts that I have mentioned arose because it came into conflict with other policies. You got into difficulty with other people, not because they were invading your soil, but because you were asserting certain rights, and they were asserting what they believed to be certain other rights; and wars nearly always arise in that way; from the collision of policies, not from mere predatory invasion.

Now the importance of the distinction I am here making is that in the case of a collision of policy it is quite possible for both sides to believe themselves to be fighting on the defensive.

If international relations were simply a matter of each keeping his hands from property clearly that of another, his feet from the soil of others, the problem would be simple.

Each would know exactly what the other expected, what his obligations were. But it is not as simple as that, and these wars of policy may, and generally do arise, between nations each of which believes itself to be absolutely in the right and the enemy absolutely in the wrong; each believing that it is defending itself against the unprovoked aggression of the other.

Both of these facts—that the arms of a great nation are necessarily for the defense of a policy rather than of territory, and that two policies which conflict may both have purely defensive motives—are also strikingly illustrated by American history.

Take one great incident of that history. I refer to the Venezuela affair, in Mr. Cleveland's Administration. You remember the facts of that. Great Britain had had a long-standing dispute, one that had gone on for generations, with Venezuela, concerning the boundary of a little colony in South America. Suddenly, out of the blue, Mr. Cleveland, through his Secretary of State, announced to Great Britain that he had decided to appoint a commission to determine that boundary, and that Great Britain would have to accept

its decision or fight. Now, Englishmen were rather insistent on their interpretation of that boundary (an interpretation, by the way, which was confirmed in nearly every point by the commission which finally did sit), because otherwise citizens of Great Britain, accustomed to the orderly government of a British colony, might find themselves transferred to the disorderly government of Venezuela. You remember what Venezuela was at the time. It was Mexico, only very much more so! And when Mr. Cleveland announced that they would have to accept the decision of his commission as to that boundary or fight, Englishmen (and some Americans) said "What the blazes has that got to do with the United States!" I am not giving my view necessarily; I am giving you the view of the Englishman of the time. "How can it possibly affect the interests of the United States," he asked, "whether our boundary line in that little colony, thousands of miles from their shores, goes ten or fifteen miles on one side of a hill or the other?" "Why," argued the English, "we have a colonial boundary running cheek by jowl with American territory for three thousand miles, and have had for over a hun-

dred years, and yet so little has it threatened the Americans that they have not even taken the trouble to defend it. There is not a fort along the whole three thousand miles of it! Yet (it is still the Englishman talking), they now say that if a boundary thousands of miles from their shores, in a South American swamp, is extended ten or fifteen miles, they are going to fight!"

Now I don't say they were right; I simply say that that's how it appeared to them. You, on your side, were defending something which you also believed to be vitally important. You believed you were defending the Monroe Doctrine. I am not quite sure that you knew what the Monroe Doctrine was as applied to that case. You know the old chestnut of that period, I dare say. You have heard doubtless about the American meeting his friend Brown and asking:

"What's this I hear about your not believing in the Monroe Doctrine?"

And Brown says: "It's a wicked libel. I do believe in it. I would fight for the Monroe Doctrine. I would lay down my life for it. What I did say was that I don't know what it means."

Well, I am not sure that most of us knew what it meant, but we—I was living in America at the time and so can say “we”—were quite ready to go to war about it. We very nearly did.

If Lord Salisbury had refused to submit to the American Government; if he had taken the ground that he could not expose a British community to the risk of transfer to Venezuelan conditions merely out of deference to some ill-defined abstraction known as the Monroe Doctrine, this country would have stood behind Cleveland as one man in initiating a fratricidal war. But for the submission of Lord Salisbury, the somewhat craven submission as some of his countrymen thought at the time, we would have had war. England certainly would not have submitted to any government but the American; nor perhaps would any government but the British have so bowed their knee to America. It is quite exceptional to find this degree of forbearance between nations at a time of crisis. Usually, as in the present war, some defensive act—mobilization on the part of one side or the demand for the other's demobilization—precipitates hostilities.

It is difficult at this date to realize that in the Venezuelan matter we were near to war. Yet, we were, and if it had been precipitated, not only would the war not have arisen out of an invasion of territory by either side; it would have been over a conflict of policy on which both sides were convinced they were acting defensively.

The misunderstanding arose, note you, *with the country that was the author of the doctrine involved.* That country and its government had quite obviously no conception that the political doctrine for which it had been responsible would be applied in the way that it was applied. For years presumably America had been harbouring one conception and England another; and suddenly the difference opens a gulf between them. Both sides would have fought to the end, each persuaded that it was battling for honour and existence.

If the war had come, you will admit now, looking at it in cold blood,—we both admit it,—that it would have been a great disaster for both of us. It would have been fought with the obstinacy that marks both our races; it would have been fought bitterly—for we

should have sent Indian troops against you, and so on—and both would have been rendered weaker by it. The conflict between us would have been prolonged for years, generations, it may be, in one form or another.

Now that grave conflict was not avoided, we did not find a way out, merely because both were "prepared" in a military sense. In fact if England at that time had had great conscripted armies and forts in Canada, soldiers ready to march, and you, on your side, had been ready to invade Canada, I am disposed to think that war would have come. How did we avoid it?

We avoided it because each had, as a matter of fact, arrived at some sort of knowledge of the ultimate purpose of the other's power. That understanding was not, it is true, embodied in treaties, and it was dangerously incomplete as to details, as the conflict over the Monroe Doctrine showed; but the difference of detail was not sufficient to counterbalance the more general understanding, which we owed of course in large part to our community of language and origins—although it was fashionable at the time to argue that this very similarity would sooner or

later make war "inevitable," on the plea that family quarrels are always the bitterest. But as a matter of fact that general understanding on the part of each as to the ultimate object of the other's power enabled us to adjust the difference of detail which otherwise would have precipitated war, however much both of us might have been "prepared" in a military sense. Each had become pretty well satisfied that the other man's force would not be used for such and such purposes. In Great Britain we were pretty certain that America would not march over the undefended border of Canada and seize that country without good cause. You, on your side, were satisfied that England would not secretly land armies in Canada and march across into your country. We arrived at a common understanding; we knew sufficiently clearly how the other fellow would use his force. And that is why we are able to live together in this world and to share this continent.

And will you note this: that because we were able to settle it in that way, within a year, we were using our combined forces for common purposes. When you ran into trouble with regard to Cuba, there was, as

you know, a European movement against you, a movement of opinion which might have crystallized into some sort of military and naval combination. England scotched it in the bud, as your historians know, and later on, when Admiral Dewey came up against certain German pretensions in the Philippines, England made it plain where she would stand, and she scotched that in the bud too. Our forces within the year were being used for a common purpose, instead of being used one against the other. Had we failed to understand each the other's general policy, and had merely said: "The other fellow is getting powerful; let's pile up more power," you would have had collision, and instead of pooling forces for the common purpose, we should have mutually weakened each other and you would not have been able to carry out the policies which you have since carried out.

Now, I think this country is probably drifting to war. I do not claim to be a prophet, but war is almost obviously among the possibilities to put it at the least. There is nothing "inevitable" about it; we shall avoid it if we

are wise, if we make the moral effort that will render it unnecessary. But so far I see little signs of our making that effort. And I should like to say in this connection that if I am what most of you would perhaps call a Pacifist, it is not because I think men little inclined to drift into wars but because I think them much inclined so to do; that there are in their natures elements pushing them to war, often when a better control—which means generally a better understanding of certain facts of human relationship—would enable them to avoid it. I am a Pacifist because I believe the natural—and generally unwise—thing is for men to go to war. Most wisdom by the way is unnatural in that it is very painfully acquired. I am a Pacifist because I have in some respects little faith in human nature; because I believe that that nature, unless we watch it, will betray us into very stupid courses.

And so I think that war for this country is certainly one of the possibilities of the future unless we take the right kind of measures to stop it. It might arise quite irrespective of the great European problem which confronts you; it is unlikely to be for the purpose of re-

elling an invasion and it is unlikely to be fought on this soil.

Let us try and see how apart from the European entanglement such a war might arise in the future.

We will assume that the Mexican situation is not settled; it is not. We had a warning to that effect from the President the other day. Now suppose that some future administration, having behind it a large, efficient army, is less long-suffering than Mr. Wilson has been, and deems that the time has come to go in and clean up that mess. You do so. And assume that you take over the government of Mexico. Because, mind you, the Mexican business will not be a repetition of the Cuban problem. In Cuba you went to the aid of a people fighting what they regarded as an alien government; you took sides with the population in their fight against a foreign government. You would not be going into Mexico to take the side of the Mexican people against a foreign government. If you went into Mexico with a view to permanent intervention—I don't talk of course of such displays as that at Vera Cruz two years ago, but of really permanent intervention—it would be

either to take the side of one party against another Mexican party, or to fight all Mexican parties; which is more probable. In other words, instead of fighting *with* the Mexican people as you were fighting with the Cuban people, you would in the end be fighting *against* the Mexican people.

Unless checked in its earlier stages, and unless the government and people solemnly and betimes decree that there shall be no conquest, the political momentum of penetration into Mexico—the fact that when we get started full swing along a certain political road it is impossible to stop even if we wish—will carry you very far. It has already been urged in public by a prominent military man that it should carry you through to the Panama Canal. Your entrance into Mexico will not endear the United States to Spanish-Americans and you will find the American flag insulted, American citizens assaulted, and American property destroyed in Nicaragua, San Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Santo Domingo, and Haiti, and sooner or later, since politics either goes back or forward and you will not go back, you will go forward. Indeed, you are already intervening in Haiti, Santo

Domingo, Nicaragua, and if you now intervene seriously in Mexico you will in the end impose your government on all the northern hemisphere south of the Canadian border.

Here is the point I am getting at: Having established your government in these great territories, you would find perhaps that some of the concessions granted by these ephemeral Mexican governments to European concessionaires were of a very doubtful character, and that you had to cancel them. Moreover you might have powerful parties in this hypothetical administration that I am imagining, demanding that America was fairly entitled, having done all the work of pacification, to reap some benefit, and they would demand preferential treatment for American trade in those territories. This would mean in some measure discrimination against European trade, or its exclusion. And then Germany, if you will, or perhaps some new nation in southeastern Europe that may arise as a result of this war, would begin to ask: "What is this increasing power of America going to be used for? We have had our concessions in these territories canceled, some of them; we find our trade being excluded. Does that mean

that sooner or later we are going to be shut out from the western hemisphere, because of the growth of American power?" And while these questions were under discussion, perhaps, with a group of the European nations, you would have difficulty with Japan, concerning affronts to its citizens in California, and New Mexico; and that would only increase the irritation. Everybody would lose their tempers and call it patriotism. And in this condition of irritation America might infer that in the countries which she ruled she was sovereign; that foreigners had just those rights which she cared to grant, and if they didn't like it nobody asked their presence, or their trade. And so you would tell Germany and the rest, more or less diplomatically, to go to the devil. And then that would raise, for the older world, very big questions as to what would be the rights of its populations, present and future, on this western hemisphere. And the Europeans would begin to talk large and vague things about protecting the privileges of their grandchildren, posterity, destiny, and the rest, and the combination of bad temper and vague theories and a sense of power on both sides would result in what

it generally results between nations. We should be in a war not knowing quite what it was about, but quite sure that it was important and very vital.

And of course you would not fight one country, because nations don't fight now in units. They fight in groups. Japan would never challenge this country, unaided. If she does challenge this power, it will be in conjunction with either an Asiatic country, a China that she dominates, or with a group of European countries. She is of course at present associated with a group of European countries.

America would, therefore, fight these powerful populations running into hundreds of millions, and including possibly certain Spanish-American peoples; for intervention in Mexico would probably destroy our nascent Pan-Americanism. So it would be a long and troublesome war. And when it was over, and you had finally beaten your enemy, you would call a solemn conference to try to find out what it was all about. Because after the war was over, and you were seated at the conference table, you would not take the ground that the people in the older

civilizations had no rights at all in this hemisphere. You would be indignant if it were suggested that it ever had been your intention to do that—to assert that foreigners have no rights on this hemisphere. Such a policy would not be either to your own advantage in the long run, or practicable or enforceable, if it were. You do not want to turn America into a new China, severed from intercourse with civilization as a whole. You want access to the world at large, you want to travel the highways of the world and have in it outlets for your commerce. And if you want that in the other half of the world you cannot deny it to the rest of the world in this half. So with these defeated enemies of yours you would sit down to define just what your relationship with them should be, just how far they should be admitted, what rights they should have. You would be perfectly willing to say to the rest of the world, You have certain rights here; they are such and such; not unrestricted immigration, it is true, nor unrestricted trade, it is true, but certain rights that we can accord in reciprocation for rights of travel and trade for our citizens.

You would establish, in other words, a

modus vivendi, a live-and-let-live policy, a method by which the nations can dwell together more or less workably in this world of ours. In short you would have to do after the war what you could with greater ease, with much greater ease probably, have done before the war.

You would demonstrate by that war, as you demonstrated by the quarrel over Venezuela, that there was no irrepressible conflict; that the war had arisen merely because the other fellow—in this case, say, the group of European nations—did not know how your power was going to be used.

War would have arisen, not from your aggression, not from what your force was created to do, but from what the other feared it might do, because your policy was unknown.

As you nearly came to war over Venezuela, you will probably come to war with the older nations over the use of your power in Spanish America, not because of any necessary conflict, any physical obstacle, but because of misunderstanding, due to the fact that the intention of each party is unknown to the other. That is the story of the European war.

The origins of that war are to be found in the mystifications of a kind of Monroe Doctrine. It illustrates all the points I have been trying to make in this lecture. It did not arise from any sudden, purely piratical, invasion, despite Belgium. Just let's go back to the facts a little. Here was Austria presenting certain claims on account of the murder of the Archduke, against Serbia. Those claims looked to Russia like the threatened extinction of a little Serbian state, and Russia said, in effect: "We have a Monroe Doctrine covering the Balkans. We stand for the protection of the Slavic states" (just as you stand for the protection of American states). And Germany said to Russia: "If you fight Austria, we fight you." And there arose from that situation a conflict into which entered as combatants thirteen nations—at least I think it is thirteen nations; I have not counted them recently, and I have not seen this morning's papers!—but these nations, England, Italy, and so on, did not pretend that this conflict which arose in July down in southeastern Europe emanated from the intention of Austria to invade at one and the same time Italy, Russia, France, England, Montenegro, Japan, and

Portugal. Not a bit. Why did England, for instance, go into this war?

England did not enter the war because she was invaded, or even because Germany was about to invade her. It was Germany's obvious interest to keep England out of the war if she could, and English statesmen and publicists do not for a moment pretend otherwise. Several tell us with some pride indeed that the special German hatred of England is due to the German hope in July, 1914, that England would keep out of the war¹—having no immediate material interest therein and not believing that she would enter for an idealistic motive like the vindication of Belgium's neutrality. And England had been led to guarantee that neutrality from the motive that anyhow would probably have brought her

¹ Lord Northcliffe, the great English newspaper proprietor who may be justifiably proud of the fact that his bitterest critics are now adopting the policies which his newspapers have been preaching for the past ten years, says in an interview in the *New York Sun*:

"England was not expected to enter the war. . . . Her coming in was as great a surprise to our government as it was to the Germans. . . . The outburst of rage that followed in Germany was the rage of the tiger balked of its prey."

into the war: the defense of the old balance of power principle. That is to say, England said, If the Teutonic nations win in this war, they will greatly increase their power and make France powerless. They may occupy channel ports, like Antwerp. Where shall we be? What are these fellows going to do with this great power when they have it? Englishmen did not know. Again the old thing. They did not know how the power was going to be used; consequently they said: Meet it. They met it, by fighting it.¹

¹ The London *Times*, in a leading article (March 8, 1915) which was in reality a reproof to Mr. Lloyd George for having declared that but for the invasion of Belgium England would not have entered the war, says:

"... we do not set up to be international Don Quixotes, ready at all times to redress wrongs which do us no hurt. . . . We joined the Triple Entente because we realized, however late in the day, that the time of 'splendid isolation' was no more. We reverted to our historic policy of the balance of power, and we reverted to it for the reasons for which our forefathers adopted it. They were not, either for them or for us, reasons of sentiment. They were self-regarding, and even selfish, reasons. . . . In the event of war we saw, as our fathers had seen, England's first line of attack and of defense in her Continental Alliances."

The situation, as seen from the German side, is much such a situation as that in which I have imagined America being involved. Germany saw territories into which she had a relatively easy entrance being gradually closed by her political rivals; passing over into the sovereignty of other people—Morocco to France, Egypt to Great Britain, etc. Germany saw the power of this group increasing, and said: "Are we going to be excluded? How is this other fellow going to use his power?" And instead of sitting down—those two great groups—and each saying to the other, What is it that you want? Is it anything that we cannot give? Cannot we establish a *modus vivendi*, so that we can all live together in the world? Instead of that, what each did was to "Prepare," prepare that is on the military and naval side alone. It was because the preparedness was by half measures that the collision finally came.

The only thing they really did do, towards solving the conflict between them, was for each to try and become stronger than the other.¹ And that ended, as it was bound to

¹ I am not overlooking the Algeiras Conferences and the discussions they provoked, etc. See p. 89.

end, in explosion. When it is all over, they will have to sit down and come to some sort of an arrangement. If they had done that before the explosion would never have taken place.

Where there are certain compelling forces, as in the Venezuelan case, you get this clarification of intention before collision comes. You have had it in certain other cases. Englishmen for many years pitted their military power against that of France or Russia because it was thought that its intention might be hostile. And yet, as events showed, it was not impossible to satisfy each other as to their respective intentions. Obviously France and Russia have managed to persuade England that their power is not hostile; Russia that she does not contemplate the conquest of India, France that she is quite ready to bargain about Egypt, and so on. But so long as the intention of each to the other was unknown—each perhaps quite possibly not knowing what its own intention really was—each had to meet the power of the other. If that competition in physical force had gone on, and they had not manifested their intention to one another by the formulation of definite foreign

policies, their increasing power would not have protected them. The efforts of each would have canceled those of the other. And their arming against each other must finally, of course, have ended in explosion. And then, not only would they have been endangered by one another, but also, when mutually weakened by their struggles, they would have been in danger from the common enemy whom they are now fighting—except that he has become an enemy mainly because power, such as theirs might become, seemed to him a menace of the future that he had to anticipate. I don't at all rule out the existence of a definite "plot" of aggression on the part of certain German persons or parties. But how did those parties secure the coöperation of the German people as a whole throughout the past years? Not by talking of aggression, but by persuading the people that this power of the others threatened them and that if the fatherland and nationality were to be safe they must reduce it. And to-day in Germany, from all that we can gather, there is just as much talk about the main object being to make it impossible for the enemies again to threaten the peace of the world—just as

much of that kind of talk in Germany as there is in England or in France.

The Balance of Power, on behalf of which England has fought so many wars, is of course born of this same phenomenon in politics: power, the object of which is not clearly manifest, must be canceled by equivalent power—balanced, since it *may* be used against us.

I want to say a word about the Balance of Power. There is no such thing. Balance of power means that the balance shall be tilted in your favour. Because military power is an unknown quantity, you cannot estimate it exactly. Military science, indeed, is a very inexact science, and consequently each nation wants to give itself the benefit of the doubt, and you arrive at this: if you are to be certain of being protected you must be a bit stronger than the other fellow. Mr. Winston Churchill has laid down the rule: The only way to achieve security, to make sure of your defense, and to insure peace, is to be so much stronger than the other party that he won't find it worth while to attack you. That sounds an axiom. But unfortunately, war is a matter of two parties, and when you apply this axiom

to the two parties, this is the result you get: Here are two groups of nations, or two nations, likely to come to blows. How shall each party be secure, defend itself and preserve peace? And our statesmen in the profundity of their wisdom say, "Each will be secure and properly defended if each is stronger than the other"! And the policy which Europe is pursuing as a means of defense and security, and the policy which is now recommended to you as a means of peace and security and defense, is based upon the need of each being stronger than the other, is based upon the attainment of a physical impossibility. There is no end that way. You cannot get security, you cannot protect your interests that way, you cannot vindicate your rights.

I want to show in another way how the doubtfulness as to the end for which your power will be used results in making it ineffective, even when it is very great, to maintain the peace. It is said, though whether rightly I do not know, that Germany did not know that England would go into this war. If that is true, England's power, however great, would not have prevented the war—restrained Germany—because Germany did not know

The Dangers of

the power would be used against her. And if that is the Germany's own preparedness and the two security based on the idea that she would have the predominant force, was destroyed over again by the entrance of some-
body else into the picture. Don't you see, that it is really not that if you do not make it clear beforehand how your power is to be used, you cannot get security?"

Mr. Gardner of Massachusetts is quoted in a report in an address at the National Civic Conference in Washington (Jan. 27, 1916): "If there had been no British movement in Great Britain . . . I think France and Great Britain instead of Norman England there would have been no war . . . Pacifism might be the end of violence and arms."

But what is the meaning of Mr. Gardner says:

"I think Britain in 1914 had said to Germany: 'If you don't stop your fight with her, there would be a war or war.' So apparently in Mr. Gardner's view the war could have been prevented with warning if England had made a clear declaration to that effect."

But what is the meaning of Mr. Gardner that it is not my modesty which motivates the statement that Great Britain did more to Lord Roberts a great deal more than it did to Norman England. I have never opposed armaments, have always energetically refused to take any part in armaments to them. I refused even to oppose armaments. I have, on the other hand, energetically

Of course, I know it is argued that in some wonderful way peace would have been maintained in Europe, we should not have had this war, if this, that, or the other Power had been more "prepared." Well, I suppose those who say that this war is due to the fact of unpreparedness do not apply the explanation to Germany: I have heard no one argue that peace would have been kept in Europe if Germany had been more prepared! Personally, as an Englishman, I do not think so! I suppose it is applied to the Entente Powers. It is argued that if only they had been more "prepared" we should have had peace. And the moral is pointed at you.

Let's examine it. I will take the Entente Powers in order, and Italy first, for a special reason. Suppose Italy had been much stronger before the war than she was? Italy was a member of the Teutonic Alliance before the war, and Germany was counting on the support of the Italian force. Consequently, if Italy had been much stronger that fact would

avored a plain and categorical statement of policy; which I gather might even with existing arms, in Mr. Gardner's opinion, have saved the situation.

only have encouraged Germany's aggression, if you take the view that Germany was the aggressor.

Take Russia. Suppose she had organized the immense potential forces she possesses, represented by a population of one hundred and sixty or seventy million souls, on the Prussian model, and had had in consequence an army of anything from fifteen to twenty-five million men. Well, if that had been the case twenty-five years ago, Russia would have won the Russo-Japanese War. She would have conquered Korea, and imposed a protectorate upon Manchuria, and a partial protectorate in China. Then we should have been faced with a great military combination in Europe, stretching over half the world, numbering anything from two to three to four hundred million souls, very militarized, very menacing, straddling the road to India. You know of course that the Russian menace against India was for nearly a century the bogey of English politics. Do you think anybody in Europe would have felt secure?

Would the Dogger Bank incident in those circumstances have been settled peaceably?

Would not the situation have been one in which it would have been all but inevitable for England to have entered the field with Japan against Russia?—especially if England had had a large army ready for overseas service.

That brings us to the case of England.

It is not merely with reference to Russia that international groupings would certainly have been very different if during the last generation or two England had possessed a great army. It is a favorite thesis with the "trust everything to force" school just now that if only England had taken Lord Roberts's advice and adopted conscription twenty years ago (when the advocacy of that measure first became active in England), all would have been well. There would have been no war, we are told. Well, do you know the purpose for which conscription was advocated in England about twenty years ago? For the purpose of fighting France! Because France was then the enemy and Germany was a quasi-ally. We had great statesmen, like Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, advocating an alliance with Germany against France, and great popular newspapers like the London

Mail urging that France should be fought, her colonies taken from her and given to Germany! And if England had had a great army, and France also had been more prepared; and after the long series of irritations, the pin-pricks as they were called at the time, of Siam, Madagascar, Newfoundland, Egypt, culminating in the crisis of Fashoda, the two nations had been really confident in their own strength, and really believed each was stronger than the other, you would have had an Anglo-French war.

It is difficult for us now to recall the bitterness which marked the epoch of Anglo-French hostility. I was living in France at the time, in close touch with journalists and public men, and know whereof I speak. A very little more, and the thing would have got beyond control. Those of us who did what we could to stem the current did so at the risk of our journalistic and literary skins. In that day it was not permitted to say a good word of France—though personally I am glad to say I managed to get in a few—or a bad one of Germany. Times change!

The feeling as to what France stood for morally in the world was something similar

to that which we now have in England and America with reference to Germany. We in the Anglo-Saxon countries made the Dreyfus case the text for dissertations upon the menace of French militarism; sociological pronouncements as cocksure and as sweeping very nearly as our dissertations now upon German militarism. The decadence of the Latin races was then the text for grandiose schemes for the governance of the world, and the reform of inferior peoples like the French and Italians by the predominance of the Anglo-Saxon and the Germanic stocks. This was even embodied in a sort of secret society among Anglo-Saxons; it was the real message of Cecil Rhodes's will. And if you think I exaggerate I wish you would look up the terms of that will and the kind of political discussion that it provoked in England.

If in the nineties French power had been much greater than it was, and England had nevertheless to take the line she did, the Fashoda crisis would have had a different outcome. And if we had had the Anglo-French war then, and both nations had been weakened by it, how would that have left the German menace to western democracy, if

Germany is the menace? Germany would have had it all her own way.

Push it a little further back in the case of England and assume that British preparedness had antedated the Crimean War, and that Britain's influence on the continent had been such that she had been able to insure the full flower of the Crimean policy. You remember what the objects of the Crimean War were: the perpetuation of Turkish rule in wide Balkan areas, and the reduction of Russia to powerlessness. The last war that Britain fought upon the continent was, among other things, for purposes the exact contrary of those for which, among other things, she is now fighting. The last time England fought in Europe was for the purpose of allowing Turkey to impose her government upon Christian populations, and for the purpose of preventing Russia from reaching Constantinople! The word "jingo" comes from the time when Englishmen sang in the music halls of London, "By jingo the Russians shall not have Constantinople!" The present war arose out of a condition in the Balkans which the last European war that England fought had no little part in creating; so that it is

roughly true to say that the present continental war of England is for the purpose of undoing the results of her previous one.

And, by the way, when Palmerston, the great English statesman, was reproached for the fact that English armies were standing for the protection of the Turkish Empire, a pagan, cruel, anti-Christian Power, as against Christian peoples in the Balkans—when he was reproached with that, do you know what he replied? He said: "Yes, the Crimean War may have had that appearance, but its real object, of course, was to protect German civilization against Russian barbarism"!

Or, when we say that the Entente Powers ought to have been more "prepared," assume if you will that France had realized the need for such greater preparedness a generation or so ago—previous to the War of 1870, say. And I want to say that it is not I who raise these "ifs" of history. It is my critics who say that our present disasters would have been avoided *if* we had had more arms in the past. Well, I am examining that supposition. I have applied it to the case of France and England in the decade or two preceding the war. Suppose, as I say, France had

learned the lesson still earlier, before the War of 1870, to such degree, let us suppose, that in that war Napoleon III. had been triumphant and we had had, as we would have had, a Napoleonic Empire (with Napoleonic traditions behind it) extending to the Rhine.

No student of European history of the last one hundred and fifty years—or for that matter, of history since Louis XIV.—will deny that a Napoleonic France, triumphant after 1870, a France once more the military master of Europe, would, from the point of view of England, have been a very dangerous France indeed, with no united Germany to offset it. When we recollect how French and English policy has collided in Egypt, at the headwaters of the Nile, in Madagascar, Siam, Newfoundland, West Africa, and elsewhere, even when France was a beaten country, can anyone suppose that a Napoleonic France, the dominant military power of Europe, would recede gracefully as she receded at Fashoda?

Now, I put it to you, honest Injun, would peace have been observed, would you have had a more secure Europe, if during this last twoscore years everybody had been more busy

than they have been in piling up each his power in isolation? I do not think if we are quite honest with one another that you would be able to reply with a clear conscience, Yes.

The position of the Turk in Europe, by the way, during the last century is a pregnant illustration of the futility to which force of itself, however great, is brought unless linked with workable policy.

The character of the Turkish Government is a thing about which there could be no honest difference of opinion among civilized western people: oppression, corruption, wholesale murder, lust, paganism—a savagery far worse than the more primitive kinds in say Central Africa—are things that the Turk never even took the trouble to hide or deny. He ruled over European and Christian populations by sheer military force alone. Europe at any time during the last century or so has possessed ample power to put a stop to the unthinkable horrors of Turkish oppression. As between the Oriental, anti-Christian Turk on one side and Christian Europe on the other, Europe has always had in modern times a preponderance of force which was overwhelming.

Well, there is history to demonstrate that the possession of this force by the Christian nations has been of itself utterly impotent. The more the Great Powers piled up their armament, the less were they able to deal with this crying scandal—for the piling up of the armaments indicated that the nations of Christendom were arming one against another and so neutralizing their power, “canceling it out” as far as any common purpose was concerned. There was no European policy, no Christian or western one, so far as that is concerned, and always could the Turk break up western or Christian solidarity by detaching one of its groups. For many years the British Empire was that group, and stood for the “integrity of the Ottoman Power,” the perpetuation of Turkish rule over Christian populations, and used British valor and courage for that express purpose: to the end that we are able to read in this year of grace 1916—sixty years after the gallantry of Balaclava and the heroism of Sebastopol—that vast Armenian populations, hundred of thousands of helpless men, women, and little children, are being deliberately exterminated by crude butchery or being driven into the snow,

the rivers, and the swamps; or made the victims of savage lust. It is for this that brave Englishmen of an earlier generation rode into the jaws of death.

And yet all this time there has existed ample Christian force, in the hands of well-meaning and freedom-loving peoples—I believe that the people who fought on the side of the Turk in the Crimea were men as kindly, as gallant, as high motivated as any in the world. And if force is all we need, why this monstrous anticlimax after generations of these heathen abominations?

There is the whole trouble. The Turkish question is a microcosm of the larger problem. Force alone will not suffice. Unless force is the servant of a wise policy it may well destroy us: the instrument which might protect us may prove in unwise hands an instrument of suicide.

Why have I recalled to your attention some of these outstanding facts of European history? I have gone into it all because you are invited to take a hand.

Now I am going to imagine something which would greatly please, I am sure, a cer-

tain eminent American citizen. I am going to imagine that he was in the presidential chair at the moment Germany violated the territory of Belgium. Not only that, but that he was in a position to back up the protest, which he said should have been made, with a very large and efficient American army. Because, of course, if America had protested at that time this eminent citizen I have in mind would not have piled up a huge mass of notes similar to that with which he reproaches the actual incumbent of the presidential chair. He tells us he would have meant business, and would have gone through with it. I want you to imagine that he had done so. For it is a very good rule in politics, as in life, when a given course is suggested, to project yourself in imagination into the situation which would be created if the suggested course were taken. I am assuming America had been prepared; that she had made this protest and backed it up so effectively that she had destroyed the German army. Now, if that had happened, certainly the Allies would have been able to carry out their program as it existed in 1914. With German military resistance beaten down

they would of course have it all their own way, irrespective of American desire. Russia would have tried to carry out the program of which she made no secret in the early part of the war which included the annexation of the German Baltic provinces up to and including the Kiel Canal! (That was the Russian program as sketched by a great Russian official organ.) The Allies—though not perhaps with English support—would, rightly or wrongly, have broken up the German Empire. They believed that if possible of accomplishment that was what was necessary for the future peace of Europe. That some such outcome was indeed regarded as a possibility is shown by a little story which ran around London at the time the war broke out—I do not know whether true or not, but the fact that it was repeated shows what was in men's minds. It is said that Lord Kitchener, on being asked how long the war would last, replied: "I think it will be a three years' war: eighteen months getting the Russians into Germany, and eighteen months getting them out!"

I do not think personally that England would have stood for the destruction of German nationality, but even members of the

British Cabinet, and men like Lord Curzon, declared that nothing would settle things but to have the Gurkabs camp in the Tiergarten.

Well, through your action, Germany's military power, her means of defense, has been destroyed, and her nationality has been placed at the mercy of Russia, let us say. Is that the end of the chapter? Is it ever the end of the chapter? It would have been perhaps in the old days when we were not such mollicoddles, and there were no ultra-pacifists. Then you really did "settle" the rival aspirations of two nations or tribes by war, because the defeated party was either eaten, destroyed, or enslaved. All of them, men, women and, children, had their throats slit. That's how *their* ambitions were disposed of. Unfortunately we are so mollicoddly to-day that we rather hesitate about slitting the throats of a hundred million people, men, women, and children. And, however much you may rearrange the borders, the people who remain within them, and the political opinions and aspirations which they harbor, are an obstinate fact. The men who have engineered these German victories, the science, the training, the efficiency,

the "know how"—all that remains. And the mere fact that they have foreign rulers does not mean that their determination to assert their nationality in the future is gone. On the contrary, all history shows, particularly the last two or three attempts in European history to destroy German nationality, that you cannot dispose of a people, or their arms, by defeating them in war. Napoleon tried it and failed utterly, particularly in the case of Germany. And he was in a better position to do it than we are ever likely to be.

What would happen if, say, you broke up the German Empire into its constituent states? Probably in a few years you would have a secret Germanic League, like the secret league of the Balkan States which fought Turkey a few years ago. This league would sooner or later detach some members from the rival alliance and you would get within a few decades a new Germanic Alliance, a reconstituted one, including, if historical precedent is any guide, states that are now its enemies.¹

¹ It is very nearly true to say of the combatants now fighting that each ally was in the not distant past an enemy, and each enemy an ally.

And this alliance would be engaged, among other things, in carefully watching American power. Every ship that you put on the seas, and every regiment that you added to your armies, would be replied to by that new grouping, because they would assume that America belonged to the enemy group; "her armies," would say the German element of that alliance, "were used to attack our nationality on one occasion; they may be used for that purpose again." And of course as this new alliance increased its power, you would have to assume it threatened yours. And there you are once more in the midst of the balance of power struggle, all attempting to achieve security by everybody being stronger than everybody else.

Now, I put it to you: would you, by having entered into this game of alliances in that way, have added to your security, or to anybody's security? Would you be in a position that would enable you to go about your own business, putting the emphasis of your political attention on your domestic problems? I do not think so.

You may say, of course, that it would never be part of American policy to destroy German

nationality. Quite true, but from the moment that you had destroyed the German armies, as you would have done in the circumstance of intervention I have imagined, you could not help what the other Allies did afterwards—unless you were prepared to turn around and fight *them*. That is the point. Of course the Germans would fight to the last, and they would not give in until their armies had been destroyed; and then the Allies would put this policy which I have sketched into execution, and you would be responsible and mixed up in all the sequels that would arise. You would be thrown into the vortex of these alliances and intrigues and would help write in the next hundred years the kind of history which Europe reveals to us in the last hundred years.

Please do not misunderstand me. Personally, I would be in favor of America's intervening in things like the violation of Belgian neutrality if it were done in conditions which would really add to the world's security and order. I wish only that America *had* a policy so developed that her action could have that result. It is my firm conviction that you should become one of the guarantors of the

integrity of Belgium. But for your guaranty really to add to the world's security—and by that I mean security for justice and freedom—you must know, by understanding with other nations, just what principle of future international life you are going to stand for; must devise a means of “limiting your liability,” of ensuring that the employment of your power will not be misused. All these things are a necessary precedent to any intervention that is not to do more harm than good.

I put it to you at the beginning of this lecture that however great your military power, it cannot, unless it is associated with a manifest foreign policy, which I would call an international policy, protect your interests or vindicate your rights. And I am going to demonstrate this, not by some hypothetical case, but by the actual problems which confront you to-day—the problems arising out of the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

Suppose that, when the *Lusitania* was sunk, and these rights of yours were so grossly violated,—because American rights *were* violated in that cruel massacre of women and children on the high seas; I know nothing for

which it is more worth while for America to stand—supposing, when that happened, you had had a great army and a great navy, and had championed your rights by sending your army into Flanders, or Turkey; and suppose further that you had been victorious in that war against Germany, and that you are now seated at the peace conference following your victory. You have been entirely successful in the war which you have entered into for the purpose of vindicating your rights in the *Lusitania* incident. At the conference following your victory, you make the rather suggestive discovery that as between what you are asking and your allies are asking there is this difference: What your allies are asking can, in large measure, be delivered on the spot; what you are asking cannot. France is asking say for the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine. Very good. If Germany is defeated, the German evacuation of Alsace-Lorraine is assured. England is asking the cession of various German colonies. As she already has them, equally, the goods can be delivered. But what are you asking? That in future wars American citizens, neutrals, non-combatants, shall not

be massacred on the high seas by submarines. I can imagine those solemn plenipotentiaries saying with impressive unanimity, "Yes, yes, we agree; we agreed before!" How do you know that the goods will be delivered? You don't know. How do you propose to secure their delivery? By virtue of your military power alone? Merely because of your naval strength?

And I beg you to note this: That by the very fact of going into war you would have sacrificed nearly half your case. Because while the more serious part of your case is against Germany, you have also a very serious case against the Allies. But from the moment you join them, one side against the other, you would have to sacrifice that side. You could not fight both at the same time—and execute your verdict against both by virtue of your power. Consequently, you would have to sacrifice nearly half your case. And you might find at the peace certain of your allies—like Russia—Powers that have been insistent in the past upon the right to use floating mines. Are you going to accept that? If so, you will have achieved this result: having fought a great war to make American

citizens at sea secure from drowning by submarine torpedo, you have left it open to drown them by a floating mine. Well, they would be just as dead. Are you going to carry your point on that by your naval power and turn round and fight your allies? And every time you resorted to arms in this way this also would happen. You would be going into the war for neutral rights, but from the moment you went into the war, you would cease to be a neutral and would become a belligerent and would begin to disregard neutral rights with the best of them. Again I put it to you, how would you propose—I make it as challenging as you will—to protect these great neutral interests which are violated, and vindicate those rights of yours to safe travel on the high seas by your arms, however successful, *unless you enter into an international arrangement?* That's the only way you can do it. You have got to enter into an international arrangement of some kind whether you go into war or remain at peace.

Now what kind of an international arrangement is it going to be? What are you going to stand for at the peace? You do not know. Nobody knows. Is this hemisphere going

to stand as a unit at the peace? That is to say, are all the American republics going to ask for the same thing concerning sea laws? Nobody knows. Are you finding out from those republics, just how far they will stand with you, so that you can present your claims as a unit? Have you established your Senate of American Republics or a permanent deliberative body to find out what you will stand for in common? I do not think so. In other words, just about half your preparedness, a half every bit as essential as armies and navies, is neglected. And neglect of this half will make the other, the mere piling up of power, quite ineffective. And when those of us who come forward and say that this essential element of preparedness should be considered; when we urge such understanding with other states that we may act effectively, we are treated with all sorts of derision. We are told that in these days nobody will trust to international arrangements or worry about them at all. And we are told, by those who seem to feel it a mark of courage to shout loudly with the biggest mob and browbeat and villify those of unpopular opinion, that internationalism, the recognition that there *is* need of arrangements

between nations, is a base and cowardly creed, a mark of degeneration, a rotting of the national fiber, and heaven knows what.

I heard a very eminent American citizen say the other day, "Treaties are no good." He put it like this:

The position of Belgium to-day is proof positive that henceforth no wise nation will trust to anything but its own strength and no wise people will waste any time bothering with treaties or international arrangements or other inanities of The Hague that are certain to be disregarded.

Or words to that effect. Now I am going to suggest to you that that very dogmatic statement turns the facts just upside down; that it is the exact contrary which is the truth. The thing is important because the moral which he drew is a very common and a very dangerous, one, as I shall show you. I am going exactly to reverse his statement; put to you the exact contrary, and leave it to you to determine which of us is correct. I say:

The position of Belgium and the western Allies to-day [you see I go further than he does] is proof positive that no nation can now depend on its own

strength alone; and that the wise nation desiring to make itself secure will enter into such international arrangements as will render its military power effective.

Now you see my proposition is the exact converse of his, and I want you to make a little analysis to see which of us is right. He says, "The position of Belgium is proof positive to-day that no nation will trust to anything but its own strength"! Poor Belgium! Seven million confronting one hundred and fifty million. And it must trust to its own strength alone! Could it? Could any one of the western Allies fighting to-day trust to its own strength alone? France, with thirty-eight million confronting one hundred and fifty million? Could she trust to her own strength alone? Could any one of the Allies, without the international arrangement which binds her to the others, stand up against this great central power? My friends, western democracy, in which I include your democracy, depends upon whether an international treaty can be kept. If it can't, if it is true that all international treaties are bound to break down, then the knell of democracy, including that of yours, is sounded. If it is true that no treaty can be kept, that all treaties are

bound to fail, some great Power has merely to bide her time until the treaty binding the smaller democratic nations falls to pieces, and then she could destroy them in detail. For it is the smaller nations which to-day compose the democracies. The great political units, Russia, Germany, China, are not democratic. We western democracies, England, France, Italy, Switzerland, the Scandinavian States, the American Republics, are smaller nations. If we cannot stand together, if we cannot form an international policy of coöperation, our day is done.

If it is true that international arrangements cannot be made secure, then the cause of all the western Allies and all that it represents—freedom, democratic government, what you will—is hopeless. The triumph of the Germanies is assured.

So I put it to you that this truth, that the isolated force of a nation cannot of itself give it security or insure its rights, is illustrated, not merely by European examples and the facts of the present war, but is revealed in the actual problems, international problems, now confronting America; by the case of the rights

and the very grave interests which you are now at this moment engaged in defending, those arising out of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the *Ancona*, the *Persia*, and other ships. You are here engaged in defending not merely an American, but a general interest. Your citizens have been cruelly massacred on the high seas in a quarrel in which they were not concerned, and you are proposing to secure reparation and to prevent the occurrences of such a thing in future. Very good. My point is that you can secure neither one nor the other by virtue of your isolated power, however great that might be; that you can only do so by arrangement with other nations, by linking your power, in other words, to an international policy. If not so linked, your power is valueless.

I have just given you an example of the aptitude which certain of our military friends have of inverting the facts, and parading that inversion as a kind of axiom, an unchallengeable dogma. Earlier in my lecture I hinted at another example of this same curious capacity. Sometimes when I talk longer than I ought to do, as I have done to-day, someone will get up in the audience when we have our

questions, and say with a smile of complete triumph, "Do you expect to get over human nature?" And he thinks that that one question has utterly demolished me! He seems to think, this critic of mine, that because man is an unreasoning animal, that because thinking is one of the last things that he does, one of the last things that he likes to do, that because, when he has his big stick he is just as likely to hit his friend as his enemy, to misuse it altogether—my critics argue that all this is a good reason why he should be given as many destructive instruments as possible; and why it is desirable to discourage any effort on our part to find out what is the good and what is the bad use of those instruments. Just get the instruments, says my opponent, and you don't need to worry what men will use them for, whether they will use them ill or well, because—just note this—men are dangerous, combative, unreasoning, blind brutes! Well, that is precisely what they are. I want to emphasize that as much as I can. That is the strongest foundation of the pacifist's case. Concerning the premises we are in entire agreement—it is in the conclusion where we differ. It is *because* man is so likely to go astray, to

act without reason, that we must, when we give him these murderous instruments, take very great care, using for the purpose our lucid intervals, that we frame a sane policy for their proper use.

Now, the serious thing about this treaty business is that in the first premise the American I have quoted is entirely right. Treaties *are* apt to be broken, and it is an unhappy fact that that treaty between the western Powers may not endure. All history—since the last Congress of Vienna in 1815 and that of the hundred years which preceded it, and which preceded the previous great European treaty—shows that when you have managed to form a group of nations for the protection of some great human need, they begin to break apart, to harbor illusions connected with the desirability of stealing each other's territory; or to quarrel over something of that sort. We are likely to repeat that history unless we take care. *Are we going to take care?*

There is the danger. What are you going to do about it? Let the danger go unheeded? Let us face facts. That kind of thing may happen because of our human imperfections.

Having emphasized those imperfections, what are we going to do about it? If we are wise we will take precautions against the dangers of our own natures. That is the lesson for us all. Or are Americans exempt from the laws of our being?

You see the trouble is we cannot do without treaties. You cannot do without treaties in the state itself, despite all sorts of catch-words, pregnant of fallacy, that gain currency. We have a whole school of philosophers who say: "The state is Force," and my militarist friends, those who are so fond of talking about human nature, are fond of the "axiom." Well, it is not true.

Let us just look at it—because it illustrates a point I shall try to make in a moment. Let us see the place of force within the state, since it gives a hint of how to use our force in international relations, to the end of making our national position more secure. Suppose you vote down Mr. Wilson at the next election. It is of course a monstrous supposition for some of you, but we are doing a good deal of supposing this afternoon. When, after the counting of the votes, you ask Mr. Wilson to step down from the President's chair, how

do you know he will get down? I repeat, *How do you know he will get down?* You think that a foolish and fantastic question? But, my dear friends, in a great many interesting American republics, Mexico, Venezuela, or Haiti, he would not get down! You say, "Oh, the army would turn him out." I beg your pardon. It is Mr. Wilson who commands the army; it is not the army that commands Mr. Wilson. Again, in many American republics a President who can depend on his army, when asked to get out of the Presidency, would reply almost as a matter of course, "Why should I get down when I have an army that stands by me?"

How do we know that Mr. Wilson, able, we will assume, to count on his army, or, if you prefer, some President particularly popular with the army, will not do that? Is it physical force which prevents it? If so, whose? You may say: "If he did that he knows that the country would raise an army of rebellion to turn him out." Well, suppose it did? You raise this army, as they would in Mexico, or Venezuela, and the army turns him out. And your man gets into the presidential chair, and then, when you think he has stolen

enough, you vote *him* down. He would do precisely the same thing. He would say: "My dear people, the State is Force, and as a great French monarch once said, 'I am the state.' *J'y suis, j'y reste*—I am here, I remain here." And then, you would have to get another army of rebellion to turn *him* out—just as they do in Mexico, Venezuela, Haiti, or Honduras.

Well, why has that kind of thing not been your history? Because you, which includes those of you who become presidents, have learned to depend upon a treaty, a compact; and the Mexicans and the Venezuelans have not. You know that when you count the votes and they go against your President, he will step down, because you both have learned to abide by a compact. If you had not, American society would be just like Mexican, or Venezuelan, or Haitian society; your state would be just like theirs. And they won't get out of their mess until they also have learned to depend upon a compact. They won't get out of it by piling up their arms. Relatively to population far more military force exists in those disturbed republics than in this. It is not the number of soldiers which

give you the security, because many of these other American republics can show almost a bigger army than yours. It is not that. And your armies, as in Nicaragua and the other countries, would be of no use if you could not depend upon a general agreement, a compact by which those armies shall be directed and which they shall observe.

Now that is what we have to do in the international field. But, again, we are not prepared for that in America, we do not realize, no people do, that just as within the state, so also between states, organized society depends upon some form of stable arrangement or treaty; else all the armies and military power will no more give us peace and justice and security in the international field than armies give Venezuela peace and security. We are still far from realizing that before we can make our armies subserve useful human ends, we must have some arrangement with other nations, must decide what they are to stand for, to what extent we can agree on common objects; and then having done that, put our force behind those common objects.

You are not doing your part towards that

object. Nobody knows what you are standing for in the world. You do not know. Your forces, sometimes without your knowledge, stand for evil things. At this moment, for instance, you are committed to a position the ultimate result of which will make your national power, your wealth and economic resources a force making for international chaos. That will perhaps surprise you, that your material and economic forces are standing for bad instead of good international behavior; but I think I can show you that that is the case.

You realize, of course, that you are intervening in this war. You are possibly even settling its issue. At any rate the Germans believe that. They say that but for American munitions, the war would have been over long ago in their favour. I do not know whether that is right or wrong; they believe it. Anyhow, you are having influence on the decision. I do not mean there has been a breach of neutrality. The attitude of the American Government in that matter has been impeccable, and neither side has any just grievance against you. But there were two forms of neutrality open to the American

Government at the beginning of the war. You could have said, as you did, "We are neutral in this war, and we shall allow our citizens to supply material, money, credit, munitions to any or all sides." Perfectly neutral, perfectly sound in international law. It would have been just as neutral and sound in international law if America had said: "At a crisis of the world's affairs as grave as this, it is the part of wisdom to keep our munitions, our supplies and credit and money at home," —adding of course: "We shall be entirely neutral and impartial and treat both sides alike by furnishing these things to neither." [Lecturer, as applause breaks out:] Now before you applaud you had better hear me through.

There can be no question but that it is entirely a part of a nation's sovereign right, as now recognized, so to keep its wealth to itself should it so choose. Actually in this war several neutral nations have placed an embargo upon the export of certain specific things and no one has ever questioned their right so to do. Now the reason why the American Government adopted the first instead of the second course I have indicated,

is because, on the whole, American sentiment favors the Allies more than it does the Germanic Powers.

Now, fortunately, I am not a diplomatic personage or a public personage of any kind, so I can cut through the diplomatic truth in this matter, to the true truth which is this: If those munitions of yours had been going for instance to a power like Turkey, fighting, we will say, with some semi-independent or rebellious state like Armenia (who had, say, secured belligerent rights); if those munitions of yours had been for the purpose of massacring Armenians, and there had arisen in such circumstances an agitation in America for an embargo upon arms, that agitation would have succeeded.

I will go further. If we can imagine the British fleet destroyed, the Teutonic Powers imposing their rule upon Belgium, extending it also by war to Switzerland and Holland, and the Scandinavian states, and those wars for the suppression of little states were being fought with American munitions—if in these circumstances an agitation for putting an embargo on munitions arose, as it would, it would be successful. You would not send

munitions for that purpose. You would find that urgent national need compelled you to exercise your sovereign right under international law to keep your supplies at home. Which shows that the agitation for an embargo for munitions which did arise after the war began was unsuccessful because the American public recognized that such an embargo would be contrary to the interest of the Allies; it would be an act in favor of the Teutonic Powers. And the American people would not stand for it.

Now, as an Englishman,—and of course, you have to discount my feeling on the matter because of my nationality—as an Englishman, I think, broadly speaking, the decision of the American people on the matter was entirely sound and good; that they espoused the good cause as against, shall we say, the less good cause. But this is my point: The whole value of that decision as a deterrent of future aggression in the world is altogether lost, because it was not tied up with, was not a part of, any pre-announced national policy of America.

I will try and make that clear.

After this war the Germans will say, if they

are beaten, "England won because she was able to enter into an economic alliance with America: she was able to avail herself of America's national resources,—credit, money, supplies, munitions. Why? Because England's cause was good and our cause was bad? Not at all. *But because England commanded the sea.* The American Government has been telling us all along that they would have been delighted to allow the American people to supply us, if only we had been able to fetch the cargoes. So," will argue the Germans, and any other prospective belligerent of the future, "if you want the material and economic support of America in a war, don't worry about having a good cause. What you must worry about is to command the sea. If you can do that you will have the economic support of the American nation whether your cause be good or bad."

And they will say that by virtue of the very attitude which the American Government is now taking!

My friends, I think that is very regrettable. Personally, I am sorry that somehow, by some means, the American Government cannot put itself in line with national feeling,

and say to Germany: "We did not put an embargo on munitions because we did not intend to do anything that would help your cause; since it and your conduct is a menace to us as it is to all other free peoples."

Now I agree that perhaps it was quite impossible for America to have taken that attitude once the war was begun. But supposing that in time of peace, twenty years ago, when we first began to go to The Hague to make our feeble attempt at establishing sane international relations, America had put to one of those Congresses this pertinent question: "Here we are making rules for the future conduct of nations, devising a code by which we can live together in our world. What will happen if somebody breaks those rules?" And suppose she had followed that up by saying: "At least we will do this. We may not be for the moment prepared to put our military and naval forces behind an international rule, but we will go this far, that any nation breaking some great rule of life between nations, say going to war, without first submitting its differences with another nation at least to examination, will not get our support, will never get our muni-

tions or money or supplies, whether it can command the sea or not!"

Now, I quite admit that that would put a high explosive bomb into our present conceptions of neutrality. I am perfectly aware that that would not be in keeping with current conceptions of international law. But I am supposing America giving a lead to the nations, and in a time of profound peace, at one of The Hague Conferences saying in effect: "Let us change international law. Nobody knows what it is anyhow. And whatever it is, it is out of date. And we propose this modification." If you had proposed it in time of peace, I do not believe any nation in the world would have challenged you, or gone to war about it, and you would have carried your point.

America has inaugurated radical departures in the field of foreign policy before: the Monroe Doctrine was one, and a direct challenge to certain great nations of the time. Would the mere fact, therefore, of America proclaiming this new doctrine of international relationship have caused the other nations of that time (I am thinking of the time of the first Hague Conference) to

declare war against her? The idea is preposterous. America would obviously have been acting on behalf of a general interest—the interest of all against aggression; her new doctrine would have been in keeping with the tendency of the time. No nation would ever challenge this American modification of the doctrine of neutrality—incidentally, by the way, the very form of neutrality which Grotius declared to be the right one, the only possible one in a civilized world.

I think we must agree that such an act at such a time could not have involved this country in war. But if the whole world had during twenty years failed to protest, would the fact of putting it into force during the war have caused a belligerent, with a war already on its hands, to declare war against America also; gratuitously, that is, to add America to her enemies on this score alone? I think that idea is even more preposterous.

What the nations would do, the militarily advantageous thing for them to do, would be to try and take advantage of the rule you had laid down. Then what would have happened? Any nation proposing to go to war would be very careful to keep itself right

with you by observing the rule you would in that case have indicated, and would stretch points in order to submit its case to examination at least, because there would be very tangible advantages in so doing. If it expected to command the sea it would want to observe the rule in order to take advantage of that command to the full, and to do what Great Britain and her Allies are now doing—secure the economic alliance of America to their cause. If it did not expect to command the sea, it would equally desire to observe the rule in order to deprive its enemy, who might have sea command, of most of the advantages of such command. In other words, to do what the Germans so keenly desire to do: have America embargo the export of supplies and munitions. Thus in the case of all belligerent—prospective commanders of the sea or not—would there be the strong motive to submit their case to inquiry, if not judgment. It would create a strong deterrent against military hostilities before that had been done.

In other words, your immense national resources would be a silent force pushing nations to the submission of their differences to inquiry or arbitration, a silent power be-

hind the principle of all law—third party judgment. As it is, your great material resources are a silent force behind the exactly contrary principle: the piling up of arms to the end that each may enforce his own view of his own rights, each be judge, jury, and executioner in his own case. Your industrial capacity, your incalculable resource, are a vast premium upon chaos and anarchy among nations.

My friends, I bring that out because I want to show you that there are other forces in the world besides mere military and naval forces, perfectly well capable of being used for the coercive processes of the community on behalf of common purposes, if only you have created the community, and decided what those purposes are. You have done neither one nor the other. You are not using your force to good purpose, and you are not doing so because you have not threshed out these problems of international right, of your policy towards other nations.

What do I mean by saying that we should make our policy manifest? Do I mean that America should make a solemn declaration

to the world announcing what she intends to do about immigration and trade rights and the open door and the rest of it for all the coming centuries? I know I have been credited with that. But really, you know, I am not a raving lunatic.

You are perfectly aware of certain possible trouble looming on the horizon: conflicts with Japan about immigration here and in your eastern possessions, with Germany as to your policy in Haiti, Nicaragua, and so forth. It is these very possibilities which are the basis of the "preparedness" man's whole case. What is his method of meeting them? He urges one thing and one thing only, Arms. I have heard one of these advocates, a man of very high standing, seriously urge as a reason for increased armament that America was likely to get into trouble because she could be counted upon to be unjust and provocative towards Europeans in trade matters in South America and to Japanese on other matters. Yet the situation which might arise because of America's bad policy demanded in his view only one treatment: more American armament. Now I say that that is not enough. It is a dangerous half measure. We should go

to the party with whom the conflict threatens and say clearly and publicly—as publicly as possible for reasons that I will indicate in a moment: “We propose with our power to stand for such and such a course. We are aware that you—Illyria—have misgivings as to your trade rights when we have established our power in certain republics. This is what we suggest to you as our respective rights. There is no issue between us at present but we want to anticipate it and so avoid it.” And when you have come to an agreement, embody it in a definite, public, treaty of peace. And when the next difference casts its shadow before it do the same with the nation involved in *that* case. You will thus build up a body of agreements and understandings covering matters that are for the most part not at present covered by such definite understandings. And you would find that those agreements would grow from two-party pacts into many-party pacts, into real international instruments, from special agreements about specific matters into general law, or a general method for the government of “backward” States. It might have a further result in the direction of internationalism.

To declare your ultimate policy in the event of it being necessary for you to intervene in Mexico would inevitably bring you—you have already been brought—into tentative arrangement with the chief Spanish-American republics. If that agreement strengthens, as it is to be hoped it will, you might approach the Japanese problem not as one between Japan and the United States but as one between Japan and Pan-America. And that would make it easier of solution. America as a whole might be able to say: "Such and such American republics will gladly welcome your laborers; in others there will be restriction, in others exclusion. In this way the American continent as a whole is prepared to stand for a live-and-let-live policy in the Japanese matter. Will you agree?"

Of course you will say, suppose he doesn't? Well, if he doesn't you will obviously be in a better position to deal with him than you are now, each state dealing with the thing in isolation. Because if you dealt with him without previous arrangement with the other American republics, you might find him quite conceivably securing the alliance of some

group of Spanish-American states whom you had affronted.

Of course there will be differences that cannot be solved this way. Mr. Wilson *may* refuse to get down from the presidential chair when the votes go against him, and you *may* have to raise an army of rebellion. But if we had always assumed that this difficulty *would* arise and had concluded from that possibility that raising armies of rebellion was the real method of republican government and democratic control—well your Republic would not be what it is. If we had never made any attempt to create a human society because it *might* break down—as it sometimes does—why of course there would never have been any human society.

And I am afraid I have failed to get home with the main point of my lecture if I have not made it clear that the chief difficulty in international relations is not any insuperable conflict of real interest, but misunderstanding, mainly misunderstanding as to the object of the other man's power—attributing to that power an intention which as a matter of fact is not its real motive at all. And the obvious

way out of this misunderstanding is for each to state as clearly and definitely as possible what are the real, ultimate, objects of its power, to state it in such a way that there can be no mistake about it; to come to an understanding, as nations have to even when they go to war—as Russia, Japan, England, France, Servia, Italy, Montenegro have done in the present war. Then at least we should know where we are. Have done with vague doctrines which we die for but don't understand—like the ones which nearly gave us an Anglo-American war. Let us understand them.

To do that you must state them in specific terms.

And of course I don't mean that the mere declaration of any intention, however monstrous, or the formulation of any policy, however outrageous, will enable you to get it accepted or to come to a workable arrangement about it with other peoples. But the fact of stating your policy and intentions in exact terms will prevent your making it monstrous or outrageous; and the fact of compelling your prospective enemy to state plainly *his* policy will prevent him harboring one which is monstrous or outrageous. For

though I have a very qualified respect for what may be termed the mass judgments or even the mass morality of men, the simple fact is that no community of people that has reached the point of maintaining a civilization at all can definitely flout principles that are essential to human life in the world. If you find such a community doing that it is because they have bemused their minds with hazy theories invented by the professors, and soothed their consciences with fine phrases which they are not compelled to define. So long as Jones did not know what the Monroe Doctrine meant he was of course quite prepared to die for it. If his rulers had been compelled to say that in the particular case I have in mind it meant killing hundreds of thousands of our race and speech—including actual family relatives—for doing something which Jones would most certainly do in their place and believe himself right in doing,—he would not die for it. So long as the German government can define its aims to its people and the world as “the self-realization of the distinctive Germanic soul” or some other learned and meaningless phrase invented by excessively learned and excessively stupid

professors, why the poor Bavarian peasants will go to their deaths as to a feast, and German mothers remain happy at the sacrifice of their children on the altar of the Fatherland.

But if the German government is compelled to state that "the self-realization of the distinctive Germanic soul" really means that Meyerkrantz of Frankfurt instead of Isaacstein of Paris shall have the concession for the sale of cheap spirits in Morocco or the Cameroons, is compelled, that is, to define policy so definitely and publicly that in the process of discussion between the two peoples the real truth emerges—why I doubt very much whether that government would really be able, for an object of that kind, to do what it has been able to do—secure the glad and willing sacrifice of a whole nation, of millions upon millions of men and women, poor and rich, aristocracy and people.

I don't mean by that that the difference of *opinion* which divides people is a simple or easy thing to settle. People believe that there are insuperable divisions between them, insurmountable obstacles to their co-operation. And this false belief is immensely

powerful,—thanks largely again to those learned professors. But the difference of fact is small.

That again can be illustrated by the Venezuelan affair. We two great peoples very nearly came to blows about this precious Monroe Doctrine as applied to the boundary of British Guiana. If a Palmerston instead of a Salisbury had been foreign minister in England, and had a difference of tongue afforded the diplomats somewhat greater opportunity of misunderstanding, we probably would have come to war and we should have persuaded ourselves that there was an absolutely unbridgeable gulf between us. Our political pundits would have written most learnedly about the inevitability of conflict because of certain deep and mysterious facts in the psychology of consanguineous peoples. Indeed that's just how certain political wiseacres of the time *did* write. And the more we fought the more difficult would it have been for either of us to see just the plain facts straight—the truth which just the simple event of our not going to war has proved—that there was not any irreconcilable conflict. We should have fought, not because

of a real obstacle between us but because of one created by our misunderstanding—our failure to understand, each the purpose of the other.

Now I know it will be said that the nations did before this war discuss the differences which divided them, that they had conferences even, like the Algeciras Conference, and discussed these things at length.

No, I beg your pardon. I cannot in a talk like this split hairs, but speaking broadly and generally, quite without quibbling, it was not the nations and peoples that discussed these things; it was the governments and the diplomats, mainly in secret. With this result; That what reached the people, and what *they* talked about, as is generally the case where things are kept secret, was not the essence of the thing, the true problem, but distorted and sensational aspects. The English are better informed perhaps than most people on foreign affairs, and yet not one in ten thousand could have told you a month before the war what the differences, the troubles between himself and Germany were. It was common journalistic comment at the time that the difference could not be defined. The one grievance the Englishman had was the Ger-

man navy. He could not tell even approximately what it was that Germany was asking—whether it was something quite possible for England to grant, or quite impossible. For that matter the German people themselves did not know. Both people had heard, it is true, about Morocco and Bagdad and Algieras and the Cameroons. But they were not moved by all that. What moved the English people were mysterious stories of a plot for the sudden invasion of England. They were seriously given to understand that Germany's real object was the annexation of Great Britain and the establishment of the Hohenzollerns in London. Now, aggressive as I believe certain groups in Germany to have been, the invasion and annexation of England was the thing you could safely have ruled out of account. The German rulers did not attempt the annexation of France in 1872 even when they were established in its capital and were in military occupation of the whole country.

And if there *had* existed such an intention on the part of the German government it would have been most obviously the wisest policy to let that aggressive intention emerge

by the widest possible publicity of diplomatic intercourse. Then there would not have been any hesitation about preparedness, or conscription, or anything else, and Europe would have been warned. But the British, like all other European governments kept its diplomatic intercourse for the most part secret. It is a slave to the tradition that foreign affairs are not matters concerning which the vulgar should be informed. With the result that the public don't discuss them; or rather they discuss a travesty of them. Secrecy of diplomatic intercourse doesn't keep secrets from the "enemy" government of course. It keeps the truth and understanding from both peoples. The German government knew perfectly well that England in 1906 was negotiating with Belgium about the landing of a British expeditionary force in that country. Such negotiations were perfectly legitimate, and had the British government been compelled to make them public, it would then have been made plain that those military arrangements were in discharge of a British obligation under a treaty, that England would fight for the integrity of Belgium; and had Germany plainly known ten years before the war that

Englishmen would certainly fight for the integrity of Belgium she might, while there was yet time, have planned her campaign otherwise and Belgium at least would have been protected. Indeed there are many who believe that had Germany really known that England would "fight to the last man"¹ against her in this war she would never have embarked upon it.

But all that the German government allowed the German people to know of those preparations was a distorted version to the effect that they were part of a deliberate plot for the unprovoked invasion of Germany, which of course the British people in their turn denied as a monstrous and unfounded invention on the part of Germans.

That is the kind of way in which British and Germans discussed their differences before the war—thanks so largely to secrecy of diplomatic intercourse. As to what the things were *really* about, the mass of the people,

¹ Because the theory of this school is that the German government believed the British ministry, despite its military "conversation" with Belgium and France, would be overruled by the "Pacifist" elements. See p. 31.

those who represent the national feeling to which in the last resort the rulers appeal, had but the vaguest and most fantastic conception.

Why, so little had the essence of the European conflict become part of public understanding and interest before the war that ten days before the declaration of war against Germany all England was discussing a quite other "inevitable" war—that in Ulster. If you will examine the English daily newspapers for the month of July, 1914,—the month that preceded the greatest war in history,—you will find those papers filled, it is true, with talk of impending war; with pictures of regiments and generals, with maps and diagrams—but they are maps of Ireland, pictures of General Carson and Galloper F. E. Smith—news of the inevitable war that did not come. Of the other war, the war that really *did* come, hardly a word, until within a week or so of its actual outbreak.

If, when England made the arrangements with the Belgian and French governments about military aid, those arrangements had been public; if England, instead of drifting into continental half-commitments, half in secret, had been obliged to formulate a policy

and declare her intention one way or the other, the war might or might not have been prevented. But at least we should have gone into it with open eyes, knowing clearly the ultimate purposes for which we fought.

Moreover, the fact that such steps as England did take to settle the points of difference with Germany were so largely in secret meant that the German people were deprived of the chance of keeping their own government in order. When the Prussians came to the Reichstag for money for what they called defense, they were able to create the general impression that Germany was being excluded from her "place in the sun." The German people as a whole had no facts by which they could reply to the Prussian allegations of "encirclement." They were not able to say, "England and France are perfectly prepared to give us equality of commercial treatment in the territories they have conquered." The Socialist and anti-aggressive party in Germany were not able to reply, because they were not in possession of the facts that would enable them to do so. Thus it came that the party of aggression in Germany were able to create the myth that

Germany was "encircled" and had to fight or be excluded from her share of the good things of the world.

If ten or fifteen years ago the English people (or the German people, whichever you prefer) had said to the other: "We seem to be drifting vaguely into some sort of conflict. You are increasing your power. What is it you want to enforce with this power? What do you fear?"—if that discussion had gone on in public for ten or fifteen years, as your discussions go on between Democrats and Republicans, Liberals and Conservatives, suffragists and anti-suffragists, vegetarians and carnivora, we should have arrived at some kind of adjustment. And that discussion *would* have arisen if each had been compelled to state publicly his policy—that statement of itself would provoke that education through discussion without which the people will never so modify their ideas as to be able to live together in peace.

For as I said just this minute, while there is in reality no earthly reason why men should fight, they have firmly got it into their heads that there is every reason for fighting; that if they don't they will be squeezed out of the

trade and wealth and good things of the world; that since the world is of limited space, we have to fight one another for it; that if we are to find opportunity for our children we must keep out other people's children; that if our children are to be fed others' must starve.

Well, it is a cannibalistic conception, this theory that nations are necessarily rival, and that what one nation gets in the way of trade or prosperity it takes from another, and that the world cannot hold two great peoples like the Germans and the English together; and if true will make agreement between peoples forever impossible. For nations will certainly not commit suicide for the sake of peace. If the relationship of two great nations is really that, they are of course in the position of two cannibals, one of whom says to the other: "Either I have got to eat you, or you have got to eat me. Let's come to a friendly agreement about it." They won't come to a friendly agreement about it. They will fight. And my point is that not only would they fight if it really were true that the one had to kill and eat the other, but they would fight as long as they believed it to be true.

It might be that there was ample food within their reach—out of their reach, say, so long as each acted alone, but within their reach if one would stand on the shoulders of the other¹ and so get the fat cocoanuts on the higher branches. But they would nevertheless be cannibals so long as they *believed* that the flesh of the other was the only source of food. It would be that mistake, not the necessary fact, which would provoke them to fight. A few hundred years ago the nations that inhabited this territory fought together for the slender food it produced. There were only a few poor thousands of those Indians inhabiting this great country, but they had to fight one another for the food, in the shape of the game and so on, that it gave. To-day, that same soil supports a vastly greater population in immeasurably greater plenty not because the population is engaged in killing one another but mainly because it isn't.

Now I admit that before our ideas and feelings in the matter of international relations can change sufficiently for us to frame workable, live-and-let-live policies between the nations, we have got to decide in our

¹ "This is an allegory."

minds as to the truth of theories like that I have just indicated. I have tried to make my little contribution to showing that the cannibalistic theory I have just indicated is a monstrous illusion—"The Great Illusion" of our time I have called it.

And do you know how that attempt on my part has been met by quite a large proportion of my critics? I have been told that in attempting to show that men need not necessarily be cannibals, need not feed their children through the murder of other children, are not the victims of this monstrous dilemma—for trying to show that, they say I am a very sordid, despicable, money-grubbing person. You laugh, but I am quite serious, and many of you here know perfectly well that you had rather that general notion yourselves! [In reply to laughter: It is not a laughing matter for *me* though.] In so far as you have judged my work, not by anything that I have written or said but by what others—those who don't agree with my conclusions—have written about it (and that I am afraid is how most of us have to judge of most men in our day) you have shared the opinion that the attempt to show that war

does not "pay" is a useless and rather sordid business.

Well I have just attempted to give a hint of how a catch phrase such as that "War does not pay" may utterly distort the real significance of an important principle or truth in human relationship, like the one which I have done my obscure part in trying to make plain. It is perfectly true that men do not deliberately go to war because it "pays." But they will go to war if they believe that otherwise their children will starve or be excluded from their fair share of the world's wealth and opportunity. They will war for what they believe to be their rights, as your gallant Southerners went to war, not for the profits of slave labor, but for what they believed to be *their* rights. And until we have clarified our minds on just the question at which I am here hinting human society will continue to fail at the point where to-day it fails most disastrously.

And so I am quite prepared to admit that before we can be very sure about preventing wars like the European war we shall have to have something resembling a revolution, I won't say in political thought, but in political dogma

—because, of course, we are most dogmatic concerning the things we never think about at all. Revolution in dogma may at times take place very rapidly, as the change of mind in Europe—at a time when books were a rarity and papers non-existent—which abolished the religious wars showed. Wide public discussion which the publicity of diplomatic intercourse would probably provoke might, perhaps, very rapidly destroy the dogmas I have in mind. Anyhow, unless we can destroy them they will destroy us.

And of course it is in the future going to be just as necessary for you as for Europe, this revolution in political thought. You see I'm polite and call it thought in your case, and don't say a word about the readiness of Jones to die for the esoteric Monroe Doctrine.

Well, you too have to make up your mind as to whether the world is necessarily cannibalistic, and then, as I have already hinted, see how far your decision affects some of the notions which you, in common with others still retain and which are likely to affect your future political action. The notion for instance that when we go into a territory and take over its government for the purpose of

maintaining order we "own" those people and can compel them to buy our goods whether they want to or not; that in other words we have the right to impose preferential commercial arrangements, discriminating against foreigners, in territory that we "own." It is very revolutionary, the idea that a great imperial Power like Great Britain or America, going into a state and taking over its government, has not the right to do what it likes with the people in the way of imposing discriminatory tariffs. In Europe they tried to burke this discussion by fighting. France may have had the right to do that thing in Morocco, but the French people never discussed that fundamental principle. Europe never discussed it. Sooner or later, when all the fighting is done, they must thrash out that problem. They ought to have done it before the fighting; and you must do it before.

You must make up your mind where you stand internationally and make your decision so manifest that the world will know the purpose for which your force is being increased. When you have imposed your power and your rule, as you may sooner or later, on Haiti, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, and all these

places, are you going to exclude Europeans? If so, to what extent? What rights will they have? Are you going to coöperate with the more orderly Spanish-American republics in dealing with certain of these problems, or are you just going to enforce the North American view, *your* view?

So with Japan. If you decide that the Japanese cannot come here, are you also going to say that they must not go to the Philippines, Hawaii, Porto Rico, Haiti, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico? You must make up your mind.

Are you really serious about these claims you are making for neutral rights at sea? If so, when you come to the peace you cannot refuse to coöperate with other nations to make the rules of life between nations, things upon which we can depend. That means putting your power, material and economic, and perhaps naval and military, behind, not your particular interest, but behind the rule, the general law, without which your particular interest will never be secure anyhow. You must put the general rule first. If you intervene over another *Lusitania* it must be not because an American citizen was drowned

but on behalf of the rule that should protect innocent human life, American or not. And if you don't do that American life will never be secure at sea in war time.

But that means entangling alliances with a vengeance. For if you are to make any general law between nations effective you must not for instance accept a thing like the German annexation of Belgium. If the nations of the world—which in the present circumstances of the war means mainly you—accept that they have announced that they don't stand for even the most elementary international rule of all—the right to national life. If that is accepted, no international law is ever going to be effective or to afford protection to anybody—to Americans or to anybody else. Yet when I suggest in conversation with any of your senators and representatives that they must stand for America becoming, after the peace, one of the guarantors of Belgium, they hold up their hands in horror, and quote George Washington at me. Well, the truth is you simply haven't faced the thing. It's no good quoting Washington. He's dead.

When people tell us that such and such a

change or development is impossible because of the tradition of nationality or the idea of sovereignty or the notions of honor and prestige, I sometimes wonder whether those people suppose that ideas and traditions fall from the skies and that men have no part in their making. How do we establish a new tradition? How have we done so in the past? Traditions are not things that descend from Mars; we make and unmake them by our exchange of ideas, our talk, our writings; they are renewing themselves the whole time. To get a new tradition of course we have to be heretical about certain old ones. In this particular sphere we must throw overboard for instance certain old ones like "My country, right or wrong!" That sort of savagery has to go if we are ever to arrive at a condition in which nations can live and work together in the world, a condition that is in which our nation will be really secure, really defended. For this whole plea of mine is at bottom one for efficiency in national defense. If we are to defend our own nation,—I put it for the moment on no higher ground—we must not sanction monstrous wickednesses like "My country, right or wrong." Such a tradition

makes not merely nations, but justice insecure. The man who says, "My country, right or wrong," must not blame the German for defending the sinking of the *Lusitania*. If you are to support your country "right or wrong" the German is right when he defends the massacre of little children. We have to change all that. And change in this respect is not an easy matter. You know of course why. As soon as any one gets up and suggests that his country is wrong in some dispute with another, and that it should adjust its point of view, you fling all sorts of derision at him. You begin by calling him a Copperhead, or a traitor, or a Mugwump, a mollycoddle and peace-at-any-price person, and Heaven knows what! The public man who wants his country to be in the right, when that country has got into an international crisis, is generally driven from public life. And that I am afraid is not peculiar to Germany. When a Liebknecht gets up in the Reichstag to face a howling mob of jingoes English people say: "Ah! There's a plucky fellow for you, there's a true patriot." But when Bright and Cobden before the Crimean War rose in the House of Commons to protest

against it they were called cowards and traitors, and the poet laureate wrote derisive poems about them.

But there is something very much more important, something very much more vital—and with this I am going to close—which prevents our getting a sane view of international affairs, and which will prevent, perhaps, unless we realize the danger and tackle it in time, the nations ever getting out of the mess in which they have entangled themselves, in our time at least.

[I can make my point clearer perhaps by hinting at a parallel in history; and it is useful anyhow to see how the people of the past finally got out of their messes. You know that for hundreds of years in Europe men fought mainly about religious things. The religious wars were the bitterest of all. The hatred and blindness which created them arose, among many other things, from our dislike of the man who has the insufferable presumption to disagree with us. Such a dislike is an almost universal thing. If you do not believe it, just examine your feelings the next time you get into an argument, and are thoroughly beaten,—your companion

shows you you are quite wrong. He has, of course, done you a great service, he has put you on the track of truth. Are you truly grateful? Analyze your feelings and see. What you really want to do is to slap him! Now, if that is true, in just the ordinary personal relations of daily life, how much truer is it likely to be as between nations, or as between religious communities. When Europe fought over these matters in these religious wars, many of the wiser men tried during hundreds of years to find some way out of the trouble, the massacres, and futility. But they failed because there was only one way out: for the people to get a new attitude and temper by hearing the other side; by tolerating the heretic long enough to realize that it was quite possible to settle the difficulty with him and live with him.

When anyone among the Catholics arose and said, "After all, there is something perhaps to be said for the Huguenot point of view," or when a Protestant arose and said that, after all, there might be something in the Catholic point of view, you know what they did to that man? They killed him. They took a great deal of trouble about it. They

maintained Holy Offices; they endowed their state with power to take him out and burn him alive and so on. And yet the heretic was the very man who would—and finally did—give them a wider conception of life, a larger view of human relations, which made the world a good deal better place, and enabled men to shake off one dire tyranny at least, to rid their lives of one great terror.

Now would you think me very fantastic if I should say that we are all in Europe, as well as you in America, in danger of duplicating in politics the exact thing which on the religious side caused men to fight and suffer for hundreds of years; that we are introducing in political affairs just the kind of tyranny that the Europeans imposed upon themselves during hundreds of years in religious affairs?

Well, just think it out. You know that when the political heretic, the ultra-pacifist or what you will, comes forward and says, "No, not 'our country right or wrong.' Let us see whether the other fellow has not something to say for himself; let us see whether by making a useful concession, we cannot arrive at a settlement with him"—when such a one comes forward, first we hoot

him down, and then, if he goes on saying it, we kill him.

You think that a fantastic mistatement of the facts? I said just now that we might be *coming* to a condition in politics similar to that which in religious matters gave rise to such gross tyranny in the past—to the suppression of freedom of conscience, to the deliberate cultivation of fanaticism, to the killing of heretics. Coming? My friends, it is already here. It exists to-night—in Russia, in Italy, in France, in Austria, in Germany, and will to-morrow in England as well.

Let us look for a moment at the condition which has already arrived in those countries—at that which is going on to-day, every day.

A lad arrived at military age is taken from his family and after a period of training for the purpose is put into the trenches and told to kill the man opposite.

If he says: "Why should I kill the man opposite? After all, there may be something to be said for his point of view. I know that my government (let us assume him a German) has some disagreement with that of the man opposite, but I am disposed to think that possibly he may have some ground of

opposition to a cause marked by the drowning of children on the high seas. I would like to consider, before killing this man, whether there is not something in his case." The German (or French, Russian, or Italian) who says this, or who, in other words, wants to exercise his right to freedom of conscience in perhaps the gravest act which a man can be asked to commit—is he allowed so to do? The thing of which I am telling you has happened. Such an objector is quietly taken out, put against a wall, and shot. And yet, when I said just this minute that we were *coming* to a time when men would lose all freedom in their political opinion—in the most important field of political opinion—you thought that I was talking rubbish. Well, that time is here. The position of the modern heretic is a good deal worse than that of the mediæval heretic. The old heretic who thought that perhaps the men of rival religious belief might have some right on their side, had, to be secure, merely to keep his mouth shut. He did not have to execute a fellow-heretic with his own hand. But, in our day in Europe, we have to execute not only the man of rival political opinion but also possibly the man whose political

opinion we share, with our hands or ourselves be executed. Such is our freedom—our freedom of conscience. Conscription means not merely conscription of the body, but much more seriously conscription of the mind and soul. It means finally, if we go on stiffening and developing its processes—as we shall if the military rivalry goes on indefinitely—the destruction in a large field of human affairs of independence of thought, of all real freedom to exchange ideas. Our censorships, the growing control of the press, of education, of careers and so on, by the Prussian type of state—very necessary to military efficiency—means that in all this domain of what someone has called the religion of politics, we shall more and more make heresy, that is clear thinking (for without that difference of opinion heresy implies, there can be no clear thinking) impossible. And clear thinking alone can enable us to find a way out of the dangers that encompass us. We shall extirpate the heretic as Europe of old extirpated him; and with the same result.

We are fighting for our liberties, our valued moralities, our rights of conscience. And you see what we are getting, what we have now ar-

rived at. And that is what we shall make worse if we go on trying to protect our freedom by this half-preparedness—the preparedness which lies only in arms—against which it has been the object of my lecture to warn you.

When we talk about defending our countries and so on, what, in the last analysis, do we mean? We do not mean so much, as I have said, the defense of a special square mile of soil, because we are all immigrants, we are all migratory folk. We are quite prepared at a pinch to leave one particular territory, if in that to which we go certain rights, certain moralities, certain freedoms which we can leave to our children can be preserved. That is the history indeed of this nation. If certain ideas survive in the world many countries are likely to be desirable places for our people and those that come after them. And if those ideas cannot be preserved in our own country—if they become submerged—there is no particular reason to prefer it to the others. It is therefore these ideals, freedoms, rights, and moralities that we desire to protect by the efforts that we are making. Well, if your defense must involve an ever-increasing military efficiency, the result that I have just

indicated will be the one you will achieve. Do you deem that an efficient defense, a real security?

Please do not misunderstand me. It may all be necessary. Conscription may be inevitable; in certain circumstances, perhaps, I should support it. But face facts. We are fighting for freedom. And I have just described what we shall get by our progressive militarization unless we recognize this arming one against another as a dangerous temporary expedient like the administration of dangerous drugs to an invalid—something necessary, it may be, for his very life, but something also which will cost him his life if we have to go on increasing the dose; something which will kill him unless we can sooner or later manage to enable him to do without it. And there comes a stage when the stress and weight of our effort must be directed to that end mainly. And if our modern world is to have real health we must realize that we are approaching just that crisis.

There is the difference between myself and some of my military, or rather my militarist, friends and critics. They don't regard all this

militarization as a dangerous temporary expedient; they look upon it as something normal and healthy in the state; something in itself good. And they disparage and deprecate any real effort of our mind and will to find a substitute. Very many who help to make public opinion in this matter, and consequently help to determine the direction of the national impulse, don't particularly want to change this thing. They cannot talk of it for ten minutes without drifting into emphasis on the advantages of war in itself; its moral stimulus and the rest.

Suppose it is all true. What relevancy have the compensations of war since those who urge these compensations tell us that the object of all their preparedness is to prevent our having war? In one breath they tell us their sole object is to preserve peace—"the battle cry of peace"—and in the next that peace is an ignoble ideal; that war does men good—and that we shall never have war if we take their advice.

Don't I recognize the beneficence of the surgeon's knife? they ask me. Yes, a thousand times, yes. But suppose your child is threatened with the loss, say, of her hands

through blood-poisoning. You call in a doctor. Instead of moving heaven and earth to save those hands—in his heart he is evidently indifferent to that and really does not want to make the effort—he begins to bluster vaguely about the beauties of surgery and amputation and how much it would improve the child's character to lose her hands; what fortitude she would develop, what a molly-coddle you are to be disturbed at the idea of a little girl without hands, "men with red blood in their veins aren't afraid of surgery" what would you do to that doctor? God in Heaven, you would kill him as a public danger.

Yet it is that kind of moral perversion and intellectual befuddlement that is particularly fashionable just now; our newspapers reek of it, eminent public men wallow in it. And you applaud it.

Where are we all drifting? What are we going to make of this world of ours in the near future? What are we going to leave after us? We are not particularly interested in posterity of course. And yet,—

There is a fine phrase somewhere in Nietzsche, something to this effect: "Let us give up talking about the Fatherland, and

talk about the Children's land." That is wise counsel, because as a matter of fact we live and labor for the children; for the future. The young man going out into the world is looking to his future career; to the kind of society which he will help to make and of which he will be a part. We who have children, work for their future—to transmit to them comfort, freedom, the things we value. When we realize this we see that "posterity" is not something vague and in the clouds; it is the actual youngsters growing up in our homes. What are you going to do for them? What are you going to leave them? What kind of freedoms and moralities, what kind of American society? If you really mean to protect their freedom, their rights of conscience; to see that they shall not inherit a world so evil that it will ask of them to execute with their own hands the man, the possibly brave and noble man who may happen perhaps to share their beliefs; if you are determined to transmit to them things you believe of great value, things your fathers have left to you, and for which they suffered so much; if you want that, then you will have to make your preparedness a real, a whole one; you will

have to think as well as to get angry; to ask nothing of the other man you would not give; you will have to try to be right as well as strong.

So my final question is: What will you do with this America of yours—the Land of your Fathers, but, much more than that, the Land of your Children?

SOME QUESTIONS.

Among the questions asked at the meeting at Poli's Theatre, Washington, February 27, 1916, were the following:

QUESTION. We are all agreed that a certain amount of preparedness is essential. Mr. Angell did not indicate even approximately what he thought should be the proper preparedness in a vast country like this. I would like to ask him to give even approximately some idea of the amount of preparedness we should have, and who should determine it.

MR. ANGELL. I do not know that it is necessary for me to answer that at all, because I have not been dealing with the military side of preparedness, the discussion of which is now so widespread. I do not think any one would urge, just now at least, that the advocacy of the military aspect of preparedness is neglected. But the other side, that of policy, is very much neglected, and it is with that that I have been dealing. I do not pretend to know just the size of the army America should have. And I will let you into another secret. Nobody knows the sized army that America should have! It's all guesswork, and it's guesswork in large part, because we do not know what we are going to use the army for; we do not know who our allies are going to be, who our enemies, who is going to support us in the policies we intend to defend with it, and who oppose us. Until we

The Dangers of

do know those things it is poor guesswork. That is why no one at present can really answer that question— it depends upon things you have not so far settled. I do not take a position against the need of arms. I recognize, I believe, that armaments are a necessity; but I say that all human experience shows them to be at times a dangerous necessity.

Now that does not condemn them. It does indicate that if you are wise you will take precautions against the danger, by making clear in your own minds how and in what circumstances you are going to use them; and that you must, above all, let the party against whom they are implicitly, at least, created, know what your intention is.

And there is another reason why I would not mix the advocacy of policy with the advocacy of armament. If I were to urge here to-night the need for greatly increasing your army, that is about all that you would carry away from the lecture. Because in the mind of most of you the whole problem of security and defense lies in the issue of large army *versus* small army. And the burden of my talk is to show you that that is not the issue. And if I had advocated an increase, the outstanding impression in your mind would be that a "Pacifist" had admitted need of such increase (and you would probably have inferred that such admission was an abandonment of his doctrine, which it is not), and from that you would infer that you had done your duty as a citizen when you had increased the army—and my lecture would have gone for nothing.

A man asks his doctor whether such and such a drug is useful and how much he can use. And the doctor replies: "It is useful if you combine it with some-

thing else, but dangerous if you do not; and the quantity depends upon certain conditions." That is not evasive. And yet do you know that that answer, simple and true, will never satisfy many of my critics? It is as though the man who asked that question of the doctor went on: "No, no; I don't want any 'ifs'; I want to know if that drug is good, 'Yes' or 'No,'" and the doctor replies, "It is good if combined with something else," and so it would go on everlastingly. You cannot satisfy that kind of critic.

You know there is an old forensic dodge which seeks to put a man who is sincere in the position of apparently giving an evasive reply. The counsel says to the witness: "Now, I want no quibbling. I want yes or no for an answer: Have you left off beating your wife?" Well try and answer it with a yes or no. There are many circumstances in life in which you cannot give a yes or no answer. You can give only a contingent answer. Thus in this matter, if America had a clear policy, was evidently standing for a clear international purpose, which we could see pretty plainly would give us national security, I, for one, would not mind how much military and naval power she had; and I do not believe most pacifists would mind either. What they really fear is great power with no definite purpose behind it. Great explosives just lying around to be used for no very definite object, have a habit of going off, all by themselves!

QUESTION. What is your advice to the American people in regard to the Monroe Doctrine?

MR. ANGELL. My advice—this is presumptuous, but I am asked to be presumptuous—my advice to

the American people with regard to the Monroe Doctrine is to turn it into a mutually defensive alliance between the American republics. The Monroe Doctrine will not then have the patronizing aspect that it has had heretofore in the eyes of the other American republics. And a mutual arrangement between all American republics to stand in common for their defense against aggression would be, I think (one can not be dogmatic about it), free from the danger of creating resentment in Europe; it would not lead to serious misunderstandings.

QUESTION. Does Mr. Angell think we have an Asiatic peril in this country, and if so, what would he suggest to work out that problem?

MR. ANGELL. If the Asiatic peril is a real one, it is high time that we European peoples composed our differences. Assume for the moment that the Japanese peril *is* real. Have you noticed what Japan has done during this war, and what the outcome of the war is so far as Japan is concerned? The European nations included a great people who seemed to have a natural genius for military organization, the Germans. The effect of the world war will be to weaken that people relatively, and the whole of Europe absolutely. Supposing that Japan had some plan of world aggression? That would then from her point of view be an extraordinarily desirable thing. It makes a curious impression on one to read that the Russians are employing Japanese artillery instructors and Japanese artillery for the purpose of destroying the Germans. And while this is going on, and attention is withdrawn, Japan is imposing her power, as far as she can, on four hundred

million Chinamen. If this is a real peril—by that I mean if the Japanese really are plotting aggression, and that they are pushed by a real need towards it—I suggest that we see first whether we Western peoples cannot compose our differences. For, if we can neither satisfy the demands of the Japanese, nor compose our own differences, then nothing else that we can do will save us from the peril.

QUESTION. Does not war furnish capital a golden opportunity?

MR. ANGELL. I do not know why capital should rejoice at the destruction of those people upon whom it is supposed to live, and of the wealth it is supposed to tax. I do not say for a moment that there are not capitalist groups who do not make money out of war. They do. I heard once a little story about the coffin trust in China, and I tell it to you because it illustrates the answer to that question. Cholera broke out in a Chinese province, and the viceroy tried by sanitary measures, employing European doctors, etc., to stop it. But that did not suit the coffin trust, so they gave a large number of shares to the viceroy and advertised very largely in the native press. Thereupon arose a great uproar against the employment of foreign doctors, or the enforcement of any sanitary measures whatsoever. The viceroy was to his great regret, of course, in face of this popular demand, compelled to rescind the sanitary measures. Cholera raged and the Coffin Trust paid large dividends. "Which proves," say the Chinese socialists, "that cholera is a capitalistic interest, and that you will never get rid of cholera until you get rid of capital." Now, war is about like cholera,

but I do not really think we must get rid of capital before we tackle the problem of war.

QUESTION. I would like to ask whether Mr. Angell does not consider socialism as one of the greatest influences tending towards peace at the present day.

MR. ANGELL. Yes, undoubtedly I do. But I would like to add a caution to that reply. You get a type of socialist like my Chinese socialist, who says, "All this talk of peace, etc., is no good. If you get socialism there will be no more war." He certainly does resemble the Chinaman who believes you can never get rid of cholera unless you get rid of capital. I do not believe it. I certainly believe socialism is a great force against war, but there are other forces as well, and we need not wait for the full flowering of the socialistic state before we attack the problem of improving international relations. Indeed we cannot so wait; for Socialism itself can conceivably be turned to the service of military oppression.

QUESTION. Is it not true that none of the belligerent countries has recognized the rights of their women? If they had, would it have had any effect on preventing the war? And after the war, what will be the effect of the war upon women?

MR. ANGELL. I am very sorry, but I do not know. And I should not dare to answer if I did!

QUESTION. Does he think that one who sympathizes with Germany and France and England can at the same time sympathize with Russia?

MR. ANGELL. Most assuredly. Why not?

QUESTION. Are the Germans unified in their national feeling during this war, and if so, what would be the effect of that in internationalism? How could national feeling be prevented from arising in a future contingency?

MR. ANGELL. I do not know whether Germany is a unit in its feeling about this war. You know it is very common to talk about "Germany" and "England" thinking this or that, or intending this or that; but nobody really knows. Just before the war, it was common to hear in Germany that "England" intended to precipitate war at such and such a date, or in England that Germany in 1927 would do thus and so. Sometimes when I heard that kind of conversation I would say to the Englishman (or the German as the case may be): "Now you are an Englishman having lived all your life in England, will you kindly tell me what England will do at the next general election about the Home Rule question, say?" And, strange to say, though the German or the Englishman, as the case may be, knew what foreign countries were thinking, and what they were going to do, they had not that information about their own country. I do not know whether Germany is a unit or not, and the Germans probably themselves do not know. Intentions, wills, aspirations, or what you will, are the result, amongst other things, of our discussions; of an exchange of ideas between ourselves. Intentions grow and multiply. They do not remain the same. Consequently, I do not think you can answer that question definitely and briefly. I am very sorry.

QUESTION. I notice in all the discussions which are

carried on in the newspapers and magazines, and also very largely in public meetings between pacifists and militarists, that the attitude of the Christian religion to international welfare is almost never referred to or mentioned. I would like to ask Mr. Angell what is his explanation of that. Because it seems to me that the application of the Christian ideal is the only way to lead us into the larger preparation that Mr. Angell has recommended. Why is it that the judgment or advice of the founder of the Christian religion gets almost no mention whatever in this debate?

MR. ANGELL. The answer to that question is very simple. I do not want to be irreverent, but to be plain and direct. The truth is that all of us, in our hearts, think that on this matter Jesus Christ was a hopeless crank who did not know what he was talking about. We simply put no faith in his recommendations whatever.

(Persons on platform and members of audience: "No, never; you don't mean that!")

MR. ANGELL (*continuing*):

Well, you can put it to a very simple test. Read the Sermon on the Mount, imbue yourself with its temper, familiarize yourself completely with its quite obvious principles, and then, the next time there is a discussion on the war and what ought to be done about it, at your club or your university society, make a proposal which is really based on the Sermon on the Mount. Turn it of course into modern speech, make your suggestions in terms of modern politics—so that no one will have the slightest idea where you got the suggestions—and then having done that at your club or debating society or in your newspaper, canvass your friends—your

church-going friends if you like—for their honest opinion. If you escape with no worse verdict than "hopeless crank" you will be extraordinarily lucky. Get some reader and admirer of Mr. Roosevelt to deliver himself thereon in the language of the Master. Just watch the adjectives explode like shrapnel on San Juan Hill. And yet the Testament, on this point at least, is very plain. Tolstoi amongst others has at least shown that. We do not believe it will work. We regard it as just simply absurd and impossible. In other words, we are not Christian in this matter, and in modern politics never have been. Perhaps I do not know what "Christian" is, but whatever it is—it has meant many different things in history—we have not been it. It certainly is not that code which during the last thousand years or so has guided the course of one community toward another. We have not yet arrived at that Christianity which would make possible the practical application of the principle Christ laid down. I am therefore just making a statement of fact when I say that though there may be exceptions here and there, the mass of us do not believe that Jesus Christ, when He urged non-resistance as a solution to the war problem, knew what He was talking about. I will be entirely frank. Personally I do not accept it,—but then I don't call myself a Christian. This much, however, I believe: that the recommendation is by no means absurd and impossible. I believe, on the contrary, that there can be urged on its behalf very deep and powerful facts of social psychology, and that Jesus Christ knew entirely what He was talking about; and that if we would take His philosophy, as revealed in the Testament, a little more seriously, take into

consideration all those psychological factors which lay behind the counsel He gave, and really consider this human nature of ours, instead of one side of it, we might get much nearer a solution of our trouble.

You get this paradox: Christ's counsel as to solution is so unpractical that if it were adopted it would solve the problem at once. It is a problem demanding such deep learning and such toil that many of us deem it insoluble. And yet simple and unlearned men by adopting Christ's method could settle the whole thing more successfully than the learning and sweat and toil of millions can hope to do in generations, working along the non-Christian lines that probably we shall follow.

I know we are told that non-resistance is the doctrine of cowardice, and that we cannot hope for the world's salvation through cowardice. That it is against our natural and manly instincts, and if men did adopt it, it would show that they had lost their courage, their "fighting edge," and that without those qualities mankind would be of no worth.

Well, I admit, I feel that too. That without the impulse to defense, without "valor" you cannot have value—things that are of worth—in human society. And yet you get here another paradox. Suppose that on going out of this hall to-night we were to learn from the papers that a great movement of feeling and conviction had in the last few weeks swept like fire through the lines of those men fighting so valiantly in France and Flanders, so that suddenly yesterday they had all—Prussians, and Bavarians, French, Belgian, and British—thrown down their arms; had declared themselves awearied of the killing and had all alike refused to kill any more, to butcher or mutilate another single

human body; had refused to discuss who began it, which side had told the most lies, who first used poison gas; had just climbed out of the trenches, gone across to one another, shaken hands, and announced that they were all going home.

Now, I put it to you, if we were to learn that that impossible thing had happened, would our natural human instinct be to shake our heads in sorrow and regret at the degeneracy of those men? Would it ever even occur to us that they were cowards? Would any one in the face of that miracle dare to think even that those transformed men were craven? Why, we should know that such an act indicated qualities that opened up a radiant future for mankind, had revealed something in human nature of greater hope perhaps than all the vast heroisms of all the uncounted wars of savage and civilized alike—that promised something direly needed for the better quality of human society, something that all the military victories that history records have not given to it, and never can.

22

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
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
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
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
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